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This thesis analyzes the factors likely to shape the future of the Russian 
submarine force.  It examines key events affecting this force since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, and explores the determinants of these events.  The Russian 
Federation inherited a huge submarine fleet from the Soviet Union.  Due to the changing 
conditions in the world and in Russia, its future status is in doubt.  The thesis begins by 
analyzing the development and roles of the Soviet submarine force.  It then considers the 
four most significant factors that have affected the submarine force since 1991: 1) 
Russias poor economic performance, 2) Russias changing national security 
requirements, 3) competition from the other military services for a limited defense 
budget, and 4) changes within the military and society.  The thesis concludes that the 
Russian submarine force is unlikely to undergo a major revival.  The most probable 
scenario involves a smaller and less capable force.  The most influential factors may be 
Russias economic performance and the military reform plans of Russian President 
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The Russian Federation inherited a large submarine force from the Soviet Union.  Since 
the end of the Second World War, this force had served as the core of the Soviet Navy.  
With the development of nuclear propulsion and nuclear-armed submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), submarines rose to even higher prominence in the Soviet 
Navy.  While it never achieved primacy in the Soviet hierarchy of military services, the 
navyand particularly the naval nuclear deterrence forcesrose in importance under the 
leadership of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from 1956 
to 1985. 
Following Mikhail Gorbachevs rise to power in 1985, new policies came to the 
forefront in thinking about the Soviet states defense.  Critics could now openly question 
the philosophies of Marx and Lenin that had been the basis of the Soviet state and armed 
forces.  The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
caused further turmoil.  These political difficulties combined with a collapsing economy 
to leave the submarine force in a precarious position. 
This thesis analyzes the effects on the Russian submarine force of the changes 
that have taken place since the last years of the Soviet Union.  It offers judgments as to 
which of the manifold changes were most important.  This allows informed conclusions 
on the probable direction of the submarine forces. 
The analysis shows that the following four factors were probably most important:  
• Russias poor economic performance since 1991. 
• Russias changing national security requirements. 
• Competition from the other military services and other warfare communities 
within the Russian Navy. 
• Changes in the social status of the military and within society. 
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Since 1991, the Russian economy has contracted significantly.  This has had 
serious negative effects on the Russian submarine force.  The poor performance of the 
economy has slowed the impressive construction rates of the Soviet Navy, and has had 
numerous other harmful effects, including wage arrears, reduced operational tempo, and 
significant difficulties in disposing of retired nuclear-powered submarines. 
The geopolitical map of the world changed at the end of the Cold War.  The 
Russian Navy could not claim the super power rivalry as a justification for its existence.  
While the chance of war still exists, global conflict with the United States and NATO is 
much less likely.  At the Cold Wars end, the Soviet Union dissolved into the Russian 
Federation and fourteen other newly independent states.  These changescombined with 
the Warsaw Pacts break-uplimited Russias access to the open ocean. 
In the 1990s, a series of conflicts erupted on Russias periphery.  These 
conflictsmainly in the Balkans and the Caucasus have presented Russia with serious 
security concerns.  Russian leaders are also preoccupied with the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Central Asia.  The navy will be of little use in these conflicts.  At the 
same time, NATOs Kosovo campaign of 1999 worried Moscow.  The NATO 
enlargement process, U.S. plans for a limited missile defense system, and other issues 
may signal the beginning of greater tensions between the NATO alliance and Russia.  
The navyand particularly the submarine forcemay benefit if Russia sees NATO as its 
major security concern. 
The changing world security environment has led Russia, like the United States, 
to change its security doctrine.  In 2000, Russia issued a new National Security Concept, 
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Military Doctrine, and naval policy.  Both the National Security Concept and the Military 
Doctrine appear to underscore Moscows reliance on nuclear deterrence for the countrys 
security, and this could be a positive sign for the submarine forces development.  At the 
same time, both documents cite growing concern over ethnic separatism and instability to 
Russias south, and this could be a negative sign for the submarine forces development. 
Following this analysis, the thesis looks at the status of the submarine force, as 
well as its missions and concerns in the immediate future.  The maritime strategic nuclear 
forces have been the focus of the navy for decades and this does not appear to be 
changing.  The Russian SSBN force is, however, aging.  Russia has not commissioned a 
new SSBN since 1990.  At the same time, the missiles on Russias newest SSBNsthose 
of the Typhoon-classare reaching the end of their service lives.  Russian President 
Vladimir Putin appointed Sergey Ivanov as Defense Minister in March 2001.  This 
signals that Putin may be serious about military reform.  The Russian Security Council
then under Ivanovs leadershipapproved a still-secret military reform plan in 2001.  
Since Ivanov is now Defense Minister, it appears likely that reforms along the lines he 
approved will occur. 
The thesis concludes that the Russian submarine force is unlikely either to 
disappear, or to undergo a revival.  It is, however, probable that the force will continue 
with reduced numbers and capabilities.  Limited training at sea will make the force more 
dangerous for its sailors and the environment, as well as less effective in combat.  Two 
major factors will determine the final size and composition of the submarine force: what 
President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov determine is necessary, 
and the future trend of the Russian economy.  While an improved Russian economy 
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would not necessarily guarantee a submarine force revival, a Putin decision to neglect the 
submarine force would guarantee its further decline.  The future of the Russian submarine 
force as anything more than a hollow entity will require decisive action on the part of 




A. DESCRIPTION OF THE THESIS: 
This thesis analyzes the factors likely to shape the future of the Russian 
submarine force.  It examines key events affecting this force since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and explores the determinants of these events.  The following four factors 
appear to be the most significant:  
• Russias poor economic performance since 1991. 
• Russias changing national security requirements. 
• Competition from the other military services and other warfare communities 
within the Russian Navy. 
• Changes in the social status of the military and within society itself. 
The effects of these factors are assessed in the period since 1991, when the Russian state 
emerged from the ruins of the U.S.S.R.  This analysis furnishes the basis for a forecast
or, at least, informed judgmentsabout what can be expected for the Russian submarine 
force in the foreseeable future. 
This topic is relevant and important because the future of the Russian submarine 
force has direct implications for the U.S. Navy and U.S. national security.  Russia 
inherited a huge submarine force from the Soviet Union.  These vessels run the spectrum 
from the modern Project 941 and 971M Typhoon and Akula-class nuclear-powered 
submarines to diesel boats like the Whiskey-classwhich would be familiar to a World 
War II submariner.1  Some of these submarines have remained in active service.  Most 
                                                 
1 This paper uses North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nomenclature 
throughout.  This will avoid the confusion that can result from contradictions between 
Russian/Soviet and NATO names.  One example of this confusion is the NATO-named 
Akula attack submarine.  The Russians have two names for this class of submarine, as 
with most others.  The first is the project number, in this case 971.  The second in this 
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have been formally withdrawn from service and are in the midst of (or awaiting) 
deactivation and dismantlement.  Others have remained nominally in service, but are in 
such a state of disrepair that they are unlikely ever to put to sea again.  It is the 
submarines on active duty that could present the greatest potential threat to U.S. national 
security.  The decommissioned vessels are of concern, but mostly from environmental 
and proliferation viewpoints. 
Russias submarine fleet is varied.  The largest vessels are the nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile carrying submarines (SSBNs).  Recent estimates suggest that Russia has 
nineteen operational SSBNs.  These account for 324 submarine launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs), which are capable of delivering 1,872 nuclear warheads.  While 
operational tempo is lower than during the Cold War, one Russian SSBN on patrol has 
the capability to launch a devastating nuclear strike against the United States or other 
countries.  Russia also has eleven additional non-operational SSBNs with 180 SLBMs.  
These are planned for dismantling but are accountable under the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaties (START) and could theoretically still be deployed.2  Indeed, the range 
of Russian SLBMs is such that they could strike targets in North America from ports in 
Russia. 
In addition to strategic submarines, Russia maintains a sizable fleet of tactical 
submarines.  These include eight operational Oscar II-class cruise missile submarines 
                                                                                                                                                 
case is the name Bars.  The Russian Project 941, known in the West as Typhoon, is 
known as Akula in Russia. 
2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 120. 
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(SSGNs).  The Kursk, which sank in August 2000, was a member of this class.  Each 
Oscar II-class submarine can carry 48 cruise missiles, as well as torpedoes.  Oscar II-
class submarines are optimized to attack surface warships.  Russia also has a number of 
attack submarines (SSNs)vessels designed to hunt and kill other submarines.  In 
reality, SSNs are better described as multi-purpose submarines.  In addition to their 
primary mission of attacking other submarines, they can counter surface warships and 
merchant ships.  They also have the capability to carry land-attack cruise missiles.  
Russias most advanced submarines of this type are eight Akula-class attack SSNs.  
There are also several operational older Sierra and Victor III-class SSNs.  Aside from 
nuclear-powered submarines, Russia has sixteen diesel-electric vessels, including 12 of 
the modern Kilo-class.3 
The fate of the Russian submarine force matters for U.S. national security.  If 
Moscow chose to challenge U.S. operations, a revived Russian submarine force could 
threaten Americas ability to respond to international crises.  For example, Operation 
Allied Force in 1999, NATOs intervention in the Kosovo crisis, involved a large number 
of U.S. Navy warships.  Their operations in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic would 
have been more risky if Russian submarines had been nearby.  The mere belief by U.S. 
(and other NATO) military commanders that a Russian submarine was in the area, even if 
it was not, would have forced significant changes in NATO operations. 
A renewed Russian submarine presence around the globe could threaten United 
States interests in other ways.  In times of crisis, Russia could threaten U.S. strategic 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 121. 
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imports such as oil.  Depending on Moscows policies, the presence of a Russian 
submarine in or around the Persian Gulf would make continued enforcement of sanctions 
against Iraq much more difficult.  A similar situation could arise with a Russian 
submarine presence in the Western Pacific and China Seas during a crisis over Taiwan.  
Renewed Russian SSN operations could also put American SSBNs at risk under certain 
circumstances.  Similarly, in some circumstances operation of Russian SSBNs could be a 
concern for the safety of the United States.  Knowing the direction of Russian naval 
developments, particularly the submarine force, will be critical to the future security of 
the United States. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis draws on both primary and secondary source material.  Primary 
sources include official documents, including statements of military doctrine and articles 
articulating policy by Russian leaders.  Addressing the societal concerns requires analysis 




Chapter II discusses developments in Russias armed forcesand particularly in 
the navy and submarine fleetsince 1991.  Sharp reductions in Russian naval activity 
have drastically changed the Russian navys role in national security policy.  This chapter 
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looks at what has happened to the forces, how they have operated, and the changing 
status of the submarine force. 
The third chapter investigates the causes of these changes.  The analysis includes 
changes in national security requirements, military and naval doctrine, and the changing 
international security environment.  In 2000, Russia published a new National Security 
Concept, a Military Doctrine, and a new Naval Doctrine.  These may have an important 
effect on the future of all branches of the military.  Military reform, including types of 
units, command and control, and military structure, has been debated since the founding 
of the Russian state in 1991.  Vladimir Putin pledged to reform the military as part of his 
2000 election campaign.  The direction of these reforms will affect the role and status of 
the submarine fleet.  Russia sees escalating regional conflicts along its southern border as 
its most serious threat.4  Official doctrine views the war in Chechnya as a possible 
blueprint for future conflicts.  These conflicts could start on Russian territory, or across 
the border, and spread within the Russian Federation.  The Russian navy would be of 
limited use both in this geographical area and in this type of conflict, a circumstance that 
implies that the navy would be at a disadvantage in the competition for resources.  These 
are just two of the critical issues facing the Russian Navy in Russias new doctrine. 
Russias declining economic performance has affected the military.  Budget 
cutbacks and funding shortfalls have had a significant effect on the military in general.  
Without an increased and more effectively apportioned budget, future doctrine may not 
                                                 
4 Russias National Security Concept, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye 
(hereafter NVO), 14 January 2000, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, 16 January 2000, FTS 20000116000515. 
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matter.  Reform in this area is underway, but without general economic improvement, it 
may be for naught.  Insufficient funding has brought new submarine construction to a 
standstill.  It has also affected operations.  Submarines have been going to sea without 
sufficient spare parts or training.  This may have already had disastrous consequences 
during the Kursk sinking.  Without increased resources, more difficulties can be expected 
in the future. 
Interservice competition has also affected the submarine force, and it is analyzed 
in this thesis.  The public battles between Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev and 
Chief of the General Staff General Anatolyi Kvashnin in 1997-2001 reflect an aspect of 
this competition.  To compensate for this problem Putin has made some changes to 
military organization, which he has presented as contributions to military reform.5  More 
changes will be necessary to completely overcome this difficulty. 
Finally, the thesis investigates the role of civil society.  During the Cold War the 
Soviet Navy was generally well regarded domestically, and the submarine force even 
more so.  Since 1991 there have been problems.  News of Russian environmental 
pollution revealed by Captain Aleksandr Nikitin, among others, and operational problems 
like the Kursk disaster have evidently lowered the navys standing in the public eye. 
Events since 1991 have also changed much about Russian society.  Since the end 
of the Cold War, the governments record of candor in communicating with the Russian 
people has improved, but there are still problems.  During the Kursk incident in August 
2000, several events demonstrated how the government still has much to learn about 
                                                 
5 Military Balance, 109. 
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dealing with citizens in a democracy.  The Federal Security Service (FSB, the successor 
to the KGB in counter-intelligence and internal security)  agents followed family 
members who went north to be near the site of the accident.    Press releases were 
contradictory.  Kursk crewmens next of kin often found out about the accident from 
television reports.6  Large numbers of Russians have an innate distrust of the 
government.  The Kursk disaster removed any doubts about the public's reaction to this.  
During the crisis only about two percent of the population believed the military was being 
honest.7  The war in Chechnya has not helped the situation.  Many Russians still support 
the war but oppositionparticularly in the presshas been increasing.  Any attempts to 
improve the capability of the military, including the submarine force, will have to 
consider these facts.   
Chapter IV integrates and analyzes the combination of the factors involved in the 
developments since 1991.  It offers informed judgments about identifiable trends, their 
implications for Russian capabilities, and their significance for U.S. naval forces and U.S. 
national security.  This analysis furnishes a basis for a forecast of the prospects for the 
Russian submarine force. 
                                                 
6 Charles Digges, Families of Sailors Angered by Silence, The St Petersburg 
Times, 18 August 2000; Object Resembling Foreign Submarine Part found Near Kursk, 
Interfax, 21 August 2000; Northern Fleet HQ Denies Foreign Sub Fragment Found Near 
Kursk, RIA Russian News Agency, 22 August 2000, reported by BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 23 August 2000.  Both RIA and Interfax reports accessed through 
Lexis-Nexis 24 and 25 October 2000. 
7 Vadim Solovyov, Tragedy Multiplied by Lies, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 
August 2000, 1, reported by Russica Information Inc, accessed through Lexis-Nexis 25 
October 2000; Viktor Litovkin, They are Trying to Sink Submarine Again, Obshchaya 
Gazeta, 24 August 2000, reported by Russica Information Inc, accessed through Lexis-





























Without a good understanding of where todays Russian Navy came from, it is 
impossible to understand what has happened, why it happened, or what is likely to 
happen in the future.  Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the 
majority of the Soviet Navys ships, aircraft, and other assets.  By this time, the Soviet 
Navy was a large and capable force with an ocean going combat capability.  This had not 
always been the case. 
 
A. EARLY HISTORY 
World War II was the defining event for the Soviet armed forces.  The Soviet 
regime glorified its victory in the war.  At times, the justification of Soviet communism 
seemed to be its victory over Nazi fascism and Japanese militarism.  The Soviet Navy 
went into the war in terrible shape.  Stalins purge of the navy officer corps was more 
thorough than in any other branch of the military.  The damage was so great that by 1938 
an officer of the NKVD (a fore-runner of the KGB) commanded the navy because there 
were no officers of sufficient seniority left.8  The navy had also suffered from a low 
priority for funds.  The Red Army garnered most of the glory.  It almost single handedly 
defeated the Nazi war machine.  The navy, of course, did try to capture some glory in 
World War II.  Articles in the post war period, up to the end of the Soviet regime, 
frequently mentioned the roles and successes of the navy during the war. 
                                                 
8 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, in Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. 
Watson, ed., The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1986), 15. 
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The Soviet navy in World War II failed to achieve huge successes on the ocean.  
The Soviet Navy for the most part was not involved in fleet combat of the magnitude 
conducted by the navies of the United States, Great Britain, or Japan.  Most of the Soviet 
naval successes were on a much smaller scale.  The Soviet navys most spectacular 
victories were fighting small coastal battles that would have been considered mere 
skirmishes in the Pacific war.  Its greatest successes came in fighting riverine 
engagements, conducting small amphibious landings, and in providing naval artillery.  In 
fact, the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Sergei Gorshkov, proudly proclaimed 
in 1974 that during the war four hundred thousand navy personnel fought on the land 
fronts.  This left only around one hundred thousand to man ships and vessels and defend 
bases.9  It is admirable that Soviet naval forces played such a crucial role in the land 
campaigns, but this kind of contribution is not what a navy can build a sea-going tradition 
on. 
 
B. EARLY POST WAR PERIOD 
The most critical period to understand is the post-World War II era.  From 1945 to 
the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991, the Soviet Navy underwent numerous changes.  
Following World War II, the Soviet Union endeavored to build a larger and stronger 
navy.  Soviet leadership did not initially intend, however, to build a navy to challenge the 
U.S. Navy on the high seas.  In the early post war period (up to the establishment of the 
Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959), the Red Army dominated all facets of Soviet military 
                                                 
9 Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, 10, 16. 
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planning, while the navy suffered from the results of World War II.  Military planners 
assigned the navy a purely defensive role.  In their eyes, it should consist of small coastal 
combatants and submarines.  Using these assets, the navy would defend the sea 
approaches to the state.  Its sole offensive role would be limited to supporting army 
advances.10  To fulfill this mission the navy operated a fleet of small vessels: torpedo 
boats, patrol craft, and coastal submarines.  Defensive operations would integrate navy 
vessels with shore-based aircraft and artillery fire. 
Soviet reliance on submarines began in this immediate post-war period.  The 
naval actions of the Second World War taught Soviet leaders two important lessons.  
First, it convinced them that despite advances in antisubmarine warfare, submarines 
offered a branch of the forces capable of solving important tasks in the oceans.  They 
became the main combat power of the fleet.  They also benefited from the fact that they 
made it possible in a very short time to increase sharply the strike 
possibilities of our fleet, to form a considerable counter-balance to the 
main forces of the fleet of the enemy in the oceanic theatres, and, at the 
cost of fewer resources and less time, to multiply the growth of sea power 
of our country, thereby depriving an enemy of the advantages which could 
accrue to him in the event of war against the Soviet Union and the 
countries of the socialist community.11 
Early post-war construction focused on small submarines.  The vast majority were 
Whiskey-class boats.  Between 1951 and 1958, the Soviets built 230 Whiskey-class 
submarines.  A shore targeting station would direct these vessels in their defense of the 
                                                 
10 Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought: 1917-1991 (Cambridge, MA: 
Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs, 1998), 171-2. 
11 Sergei G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, English edition (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 190. 
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sea approaches to the Soviet Union.  The larger Zulu-class and smaller Quebec-class 
submarines augmented the Whiskey-class.  The thirty-two Zulu-class submarines 
operated further out at sea and coordinated with shore-based aircraft to provide targeting 
information to the shore centers.  The approximately thirty Quebec-class submarines 
operated in the coastal waters.12 
 
C. EXPANSION AND GORSHKOV 
Following Stalins death in 1953, this approach to the development of the Soviet 
fleet continued.  Nikita Khrushchev took this approach a step further.  He believed that 
the development of nuclear-powered submarines and cruise missiles had relegated the 
aircraft carrier to the ash heap of history.  Khrushchev believed that by concentrating on 
these developments the Soviet Union could negate the U.S. sea power advantage.13 
The interest in cruise missiles led to further Soviet naval development.  The 
Soviet Government constructed larger vesselsboth submarines and surface ships.  With 
these new warships, the navys mission expanded as well.  Beginning in the late 1950s, 
the Soviet Navy undertook its most important role: nuclear deterrence.  By 1963, the 
Soviets had three types of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles in service
the Zulu V, the Golf, and the nuclear-powered Hoteland two nuclear cruise missile-
                                                 
12 John Jordan, Future Trends in Soviet Submarine Development, in Bruce W. 
Watson and Peter M. Dunn, ed., The Future of the Soviet Navy: An Assessment to the 
Year 2000 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 1-2. 
13Sergei G. Gorshkov, Soviet Naval Art, Morskoi Sbornik, No.2, 1967, 
translated, abridged, and reprinted in Soviet Military Review, July 1967; Jordan, 1, 3. 
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launching classesthe Whiskey Long Bin and Echo I.  The navy could now strike land 
targets at distances as great as 450 kilometers.  The navys focus was shifting to 
operations further from the coast.14 
The further to sea the navy went, the more ships it needed, and the larger they 
needed to be.  In the late 1950s the Soviet Navy expanded greatly from its previous size 
and role.  From 1955 through 1964 the Soviets built fifty-five nuclear submarines in four 
separate classes.15  Construction began in 1955 on the first ocean-going attack 
submarinesthe Novembers.  The navys mission expanded to combating the U.S. Navy 
on the open ocean.  The Echo I and Whiskey Long Bin class submarines deployed with 
anti-ship cruise missiles to fulfill this role.  The Echo II-class SSG (diesel-powered cruise 
missile submarine) and the Juliett-class SSGN (nuclear-powered cruise missile 
submarine) soon joined the older classes. 
The first generation of Soviet nuclear-powered submarinesNovember, Hotel, 
and Echo-classeswere large, slow and noisy compared to American designs of that 
era.16  In 1967, the Soviets began construction of the second generation of nuclear 
                                                 
14 Jordan, 3-4. 
15 Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Alexandr Nikitin, Bellona Report Number 2, 
The Bellona Foundation, 8 March 1997, [http] Available online: 
www.bellona.no/imaker?id=10090 [Accessed 25 May 2000], section 2.2.1. 
16 The November-class was roughly contemporary with the U.S. Skipjack-class.  
The November was 352 feet long, had 26.1-foot beam, drew 21.1 feet, and displaced 
4,069 tons submerged.  Skipjack-class submarines were 251 feet long, 31.8 feet wide, 
drew 27 feet, and displaced 3,515 feet submerged.  In addition, U.S. designs were safer: 
four of the fourteen November-class boats were lost due to reactor accidents.  For 
comparison, only one of the six Skipjack-class submarines was lost due to an accident, 
and only two U.S. nuclear subs (the Skipjack-class Scorpion and the Permit-class 
Thresher) have been lostneither due to nuclear problems. Warships of the World, 
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submarines, including the Yankee-class ballistic missile carrying submarines (SSBN).  
These submarines featured significant improvements over the older Hotel boats.  The 
Yankees were much larger, and carried missiles with a significantly longer range, sixteen 
hundred nautical miles, compared to about seven hundred nautical miles on earlier 
missiles. 
Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov was the architect of this expansion.  From 
in 1956 to 1985, Gorshkov led the navys expanding role, numbers, and influence.  Over 
time, the Soviet Navy saw its role change.  The Soviet authorities had decided to 
challenge Western domination of the world ocean. 
Gorshkov justified the naval expansion using Marxist-Leninist thought.  Lenin 
viewed world relations in terms of five conflicts: 
• Germany against Europe 
• The United States against Europe 
• The United States against Japan 
• Emerging nations against their old colonial masters 
• The Soviet Union against the United States 
Lenin forecast that Germany would rebel against the rest of Europe because of the peace 
terms imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles.  The United States would, Lenin 
predicted, struggle against Europe because the European powers were weaker, but had 
                                                                                                                                                 
Specifications: Leninskiy Komsomol Class Nuclear Attack Submarines, (Warships1), 
[http] Available online: www.warships1.com/RUSssn10_November_specs.htm, accessed 
22 March 2001; Warships of the World, Specifications: Skipjack Class Nuclear Attack 
Submarines, (Warships1), [http] Available online: www.warships1.com/ships-
US/USssn585_Skipjack_specs.htm, [Accessed 22 March 2001]. 
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colonial empires, while the United States was stronger, but had no colonies.  Lenin also 
predicted that the United States and Japan would struggle for domination of the Pacific.17 
According to Soviet ideology, the outcome of the Second World War left only 
two conflictsthe emerging nations against their old colonial masters, and the Soviet 
Union against the United States.  Gorshkov used these conflicts as arguments for an 
expansion of Soviet naval power.  Both conflicts placed the United States in the role of 
the aggressor.  Gorshkov developed two distinct roles for the navy: operations in peace, 
and operations in war.  In peace, the navy would show the Soviet flag around the world, 
and support developing states battles against colonial oppressors in wars of national 
liberation.  In war, the navy would defend the motherland against armed attack. 
In Gorshkovs view, navies were the centerpieces of the power of imperialist 
states: 
The imperialist states use their sea power primarily as an instrument of 
aggressive policy for subjugating and holding down countries and peoples, 
as a means of exacerbating the international situation and unleashing wars 
and military conflicts in different parts of the world.  The military 
theoreticians and ideologists of imperialism, for example in the USA, view 
sea power not only as a most crucial means of threatening socialism but 
also as a force capable of holding in check their allies in aggressive 
military blocs and ensuring in these blocs their dominant position and the 
overriding influence of the American monopolies.18 
                                                 
17 Bruce W. Watson, The Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy, in Bruce W. 
Watson and Peter M. Dunn, ed., The Future of the Soviet Navy: An Assessment to the 
Year 2000 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 115-6. 
18 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 2. 
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It followed that by attacking and destroying their navies, in the event of a war unleashed 
by the imperialists (as the ideology depicted it), the Soviet Union could break up 
aggressive military blocs, and build a socialist paradise. 
The reasons the Soviet Union needed a strong navy were obvious to Gorshkov.  
The main NATO powersespecially Britain, France, and the United Statesall were 
maritime states.  The imperialist powers made frequent use of their naval supremacy in 
what Soviet ideology considered wars of imperialist expansion.  By building a strong sea-
going navy the Soviet Union could challenge the West, and possibly undermine its power 
completely.  Gorshkov could use this argument to demonstrate to the Soviet leadership 
the ideological basis for raising the prestige and importance of the navy. 
The development of carrier-based strike aircraft and amphibious forces had 
started to change the role of the navy.  No longer was defeating the enemys fleet the 
main mission.  It was now attacking his homeland.  The development of ballistic missile-
launching submarines completed the change.  These vessels could strike directly into the 
homeland of any enemy.19 
Throughout his long tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Gorshkov 
succeeded in increasing the size, combat power, and influence of the Soviet Navy.  Soviet 
ships routinely deployed around the world.  They operated in the Mediterranean Sea and 
the Indian Ocean.  They conducted large exercises in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as 
                                                 
19 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, 121; Watson, The Evolution of Soviet 
Naval Strategy, 120-121. 
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well as global exercises.  The navys response to real crises increased as well, with Soviet 
warships deployed to world hotspots.20 
Throughout the period from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, submarines were the 
centerpieces of the Soviet Navy.  They had the combat power to strike at NATO carrier 
groups, as well as to deliver devastating strikes against an enemys territory. 
 
D. GORBACHEV 
From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, the standing of the Soviet Navy was on 
the rise.  Historically, the Red Army had always been the dominant service.  During the 
Second World War, the army withstood the worst of the combat.  It was almost solely 
responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany.  The Ground Forces remained the focus until 
the development of the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959.  The navy stood at the bottom of 
the pecking order for Soviet military institutions, behind the Strategic Rocket Forces, the 
Army, the Air Defense Forces, and the Air Force.21  Gorshkovs reforms went a long way 
to change how the nation and the regime viewed the navy.  Under his leadership, the navy 
became more important to the states leaders, although it never approached the stature of 
                                                 
20 The Soviets mustered very little naval response to crises in the early Cold War 
(Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958).  Their responses to the Jordanian crisis of 1970, the 
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 were almost exclusively 
naval.  Naval forces participated in later crises including: Cyprus in 1974; Angola in 
1975; Lebanon in 1976; Ethiopia in 1977, and Vietnam in 1979.   Watson, The 
Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy, 117-118. 
21 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 159, 167. 
 18
the Strategic Rocket Forces or the Ground Forces.  This trend changed with the rise of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. 
 
E. GORSHKOV REVISITED 
The very way in which Sergei Gorshkov justified his vision of the fleet came back 
to haunt it.  One of Gorshkovs levers for building a large ocean going fleet was the 
struggle against imperialism, as viewed through the lens of Marxism-Leninism.  He 
wrote that the capitalist powers used their fleets to influence world events and to conduct 
aggressive wars of expansion.  Building a large ocean going fleet would allow the Soviet 
Union to challenge the West in these wars. 
The assumptions of the Soviet worldview began to crack well before the end of 
the Soviet Union.  According to Gorbachevs new vision, security for the Soviet Union 
required all the other states of the world to be secure as well.  The days of hostile powers 
encircling the Soviet Union were over.  Gorbachev traveled to France in 1985 and 
addressed the French Communist Party in a speech that downplayed the Soviet Union as 
a supporter of revolution.22 
This new vision shot a hole in the raison dêtre of the Soviet Navy.  One of the 
damning pieces of academic work came from the Institute for World Economics and 
International Relations (IMEMO).  In an influential study in 1989, Georgii Kunadze 
noted that the Soviet Union had no security interests in the Third World.  There was no 
                                                 
22 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1998), 106. 
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security threat to the Soviet Union from the Third World and any money spent was just 
an economic burden. 
Taking a sober nonideological view of the Third World, he [Kunadze] 
argued, would reveal not only that there were no Soviet security interests 
in those regions but also that Soviet involvement there had created a heavy 
economic burden while producing no gains.  On this point the Soviet Navy 
drew Kunadzes biting criticism.  Only Soviet ideological ambitions in the 
Third World justified its size.  By dropping ideological lenses, one could 
see that the navy ought to be radically reduced.  Only in Europe was there 
a Soviet interest beyond its borders deserving a military commitment.23 
Kunadze was not alone.  Sergei Blagovolin went even further.  He stated that 
Gorshkovs expansion of the navy in an attempt to build a power projection force had 
backfired.  This plan only gave the United States and other NATO powers an excuse to 
build up their navies.  This created a naval arms race that only further burdened the 
Soviet economy.24 
Alexei Arbatov, then an analyst at the Institute for the Study of the USA and 
Canada (ISKAN), said the Soviet Union should never use force in the Third World, or 
intervene in conflicts there.  In Arbatovs view, the Soviet Union had no use for such a 
large nuclear weapons inventory.  He argued that the SSBNs should only be a supplement 
to land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMS).  The SSBN force should be 
much smaller than the land-based ICBM force.25 
This new approach was a direct threat to the Russian Navy that was to follow its 
Soviet predecessor; it was particularly menacing for the submarine force.  While many of 
                                                 
23 Odom, 154-5. 
24 Odom, 157. 
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the new thinkers believed that there should still be a navy and submarine force, in their 
eyes the current force was more than Russia needed.  Theories on the Russian Navys 
missions were coming full circle to the immediate post-World War II era: coastal defense 
and support of the army, with nuclear deterrence as an added mission. 
 
F. THE TRADITION 
In summary, with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian navy inherited 
the double-edged sword of Soviet and Russian naval traditions.  This gave the Russian 
navy a quantitatively large force.  It had the capability to exert Russian influence around 
the globe, as it had been doing for the Soviet Union since the 1960s.  The Soviet Navy 
had an extensive record of operations. 
Russia inherited the negative aspects of the Soviet naval experience as well.  The 
Soviet Union never fully accepted its role as a naval power.  Even twenty years into the 
Gorshkov force structure build-ups, critics were still raising questions.  What else would 
require the Commander-in-Chief to author several articles in Morskoy Sbornik, 
supporting the development of the Soviet Navy?  Gorshkov soon followed with his book, 
Sea Power of the State.  The most logical explanation is that the Soviet leadership still 
had not accepted Gorshkovs expanded role for the Soviet Navy.26 
What Gorshkov may have realized is what others have postulated about the 
Soviet/Russian naval tradition: 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Odom, 162-3. 
26 Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, 4. 
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The fundamental question posed to Russian-Soviet leaders has been 
whether the security of the state would be in mortal risk if the navy were 
to fail or be confined to a traditional coastal defense role.  In moments of 
acute crisis, the answer has been always no.27 
Under Soviet and Russian rule, the navy has faced the constraints of geography.  Alfred 
Thayer Mahan stated that the first element of sea power is geography.28  Russia is not a 
particularly maritime state.  While it does have long coastlines, most are unnavigable.  Its 
access to the open ocean is limited. 
For these historical reasons, to say nothing of economic constraints, there can be 
no guarantee that Russia will keep its submarine force.  The Russian Navy has withered 
in the past.  Following the death of Peter the GreatFather of the Russian Navy
Russian naval power collapsed.  During this period, ships were forbidden to sail unless 
they were transporting royalty.  Collapses in prestige have followed the failures of the 
Russian Navy in the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I.  In these 
failures, Peter Tsouras has noted, 
naval resources and strategy were completely subordinated to traditional 
military requirements, and the navys leaders were either given no latitude 
for aggressive naval action or failed to make use of opportunitiespoor 
training and a perceptible lack of confidence were evident in all ranks.  
Outstanding senior leadership was confined to a few talented men whose 
loss had decisive and negative effects on operations.29 
There is no guarantee neglect will not be the path chosen now.  Russia has always 
held that land-based forces are more critical to national survival than maritime forces.  
                                                 
27 Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, 10. 
28 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 33. 
29 Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, 7-10. 
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Historically, most threats have originated along the countrys continental frontiers.  The 
navy has never been critical to the defense of Russia.30  Tradition holds the army in much 
higher stead.  Todays security threats reinforce this pattern.  Russian leaders will have to 
make a conscious decision to maintain a strong navy and submarine force, and there is no 
guarantee they will do so.   
                                                 
30 The only possible exceptions to this are the convoy supplies provided by the 
Western allies during World War II, and the deterrence role played by SSBNs during the 
Cold War. 
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III. FACTORS INFLUENCING CHANGE 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian submarine force has changed 
a great deal.  Numbers have dropped.  Operations have been less frequent and smaller in 
scale.  The factors that have contributed to these changes are manifold.  They range from 
the continuing development of democracy in Russia to changes in the world economic 
and political-military order.  This chapter discusses the most important factors and their 
apparent impact. 
The Russian state today is very different from the Soviet Union.  The differences 
are more than just geographic.  The political system is different.  Civil society is 
different.  All these factors are important.  Each has affected the submarine force, and 
their impact continues today. 
 
A. DOMESTIC CHANGES 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the situation inside Russia has changed 
dramatically.  The type of government has changed.  The common citizen has gained 
more access to information.  The relationship between the people and the government has 
changed.  These changes have combined to have effects on the Russian submarine force. 
 
1. Democratization 
Russian society has gained greater freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly since the end of the Soviet Union.  This has forced changes on the Russian 
government and military.  Russian politicians are now facing a problem that has 
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confounded democratic leaders for ages: the Not in My Backyard phenomenon.  Often, 
citizens and the government will agree that some work needs to be done.  It is, however, 
far more difficult to find the right location to do that work.  In the Soviet Union, this was 
not an issue.  The central government could embark upon any program it desired.  There 
was no worry about public dissent.  There were no means for the local citizens to become 
involved.  There was no need to fear this anyway because the central government 
controlled the distribution of information.  As Russian leaders are finding out now, this is 
no longer the case. 
One example of this phenomenon occurred recently at Gadzhiyevo, a closed 
military city on the Kola Peninsula.  This city supports a naval shipyard that 
decommissions submarines, removes their nuclear fuel, and cuts up their hulls.  The base 
also serves as the homeport for active duty Delta IV-class SSBNs and Akula-class 
SSNs.31  The navy plans to build a radioactive waste dump on the citys outskirts.  A 
large number of the citys citizens oppose the dump.  Unlike under Soviet rule, however, 
local citizens have organized against it.  Two former Soviet Navy officers are leading the 
citys challenge against the government.  Yevgeny Burakov and Vladimir Mustyan were 
both political officers in the Soviet Navy.  Their arguments are classic examples of the 
Not in My Backyard phenomenon:  This waste site has nothing to do with protecting 
the country.  And that is why it should be placed as far away as possible from any 
populated area.32 
                                                 
31 Nilsen, Bellona Report Number 2, section 4.6. 
32 Patrick E. Tyler, Russias North: Politics and Nuclear Junk are Hot, The New 
York Times, 23 Feb 2000, 8. 
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2. Democracy and Open Society 
The Federal Security Service (FSB, successor to the KGB in counter-intelligence 
and internal security) has continued to operate as it did under the Soviet Union.  While 
attempting to monitor the political unrest in Gadzhiyevo and other Kola Peninsula closed 
cities (events discussed above), security services personnel blocked the research efforts 
by reporters.  Although the cities are closed to the public, these journalists were not 
attempting to enter the cities.  They were trying to arrange interviews with local leaders 
on roads outside the area.  The situation is no different in the Pacific Fleet.  The 
government has blocked foreign contractor employees from entering cities they needed to 
enter to do their jobs.33 
This type of response has continued following the Kursk disaster.  The Kurskan 
Oscar II-class cruise missile submarinewas lost in August 2000.  The exact cause of 
the disaster is still unknown.  Most Western experts believe an internal explosion set off a 
chain of events that caused the Kursk to sink.  This is the first major naval disaster Russia 
has suffered since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  For this reason it is a useful case 
study to examine what has changed in Russia since the Soviet Unions collapse. 
Not only is the FSB investigating possible foreign involvement, it is also 
harassing Russian citizens.  Taxi drivers in and around Murmansk spoke about the 
situation with reporters.  Whenever they drove the families of Kursk victims around the 
                                                 
33 Russell Working, International Business; Radioactive Waste and Unpaid 
Bills, The New York Times, 1 January 2000, accessed via Lexis-Nexis, accessed 12 May 
2000. 
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area, FSB agents followed them.  Its like the ten years since the Soviet Union collapsed 
never happened, one driver said.34   
The Russian Navys behavior during the Kursk disaster demonstrated how not to 
interact with the press.  Navy officials conduct during the disaster worsened relations 
between ordinary Russians and the navy.  The navy leadership did a poor job of 
managing and distributing information during the crisis.  Almost every newspaper report, 
both foreign and domestic, quoted a source within the navy ministry, a source inside 
Northern Fleet headquarters, or a source in the navy press office.  They all released 
different stories.  Officials relayed some information as known facts before they could 
possibly know the truth.  Official sources contradicted each other. 
One of the most glaring examples of this phenomenon deals with explaining how 
the Kursk was lost.  During the crisis, explanations came in many forms, from many 
sources.  Early in the crisis, the military reported that there was another large object on 
the sea floor next to the Kursk.  Further searches failed to find this object, which by all 
descriptions was anotherpresumably foreignsubmarine.  Soon there were reports that 
rescue units had sighted a floating green and white communications buoy.  The navy 
quickly reported that British Royal Navy submarines use green and white striped 
communications buoys.  After the initial sighting, no one saw the buoy again.  Later, 
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searchers claimed to have found a piece of a foreign submarine on the seabed next to the 
Kursk.  The facts never confirmed these discoveries.35 
Russian authorities failed to provide reliable information.  Reports originally said 
that communications were in progress, surface vessels were supplying oxygen and fuel, 
and rescue operations were underway.  On the first day of the accident, one source inside 
the Northern Fleet press office even said that it was only a matter of hours before they 
would raise the Kursk.  The date of the last communication changed from 15 August to 
16 August, and then 14 August.36 
Press conferences rapidly became a fiasco.  Often the officer assigned to brief the 
press got so frustrated he simply pled ignorance, and left.  Other officials, when 
questioned by family members, told them to go to the press because reporters knew more 
than the press office representatives.37 
One of the first press releases the navy issued read as follows: 
                                                 
35 Object Resembling Foreign Submarine Part found Near Kursk, Interfax, 21 
August 2000, accessed via Lexis-Nexis, accessed 24 October 2000; Northern Fleet HQ 
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There has been a malfunction on board [the Kursk], forcing the submarine 
to the seabed in the vicinity of the North Sea Fleet exercise in the Barents 
Sea waters.  Ships and rescue vessels have arrived in the area.  They are 
taking necessary measures to help the submarine.  North Fleet 
Commander Admiral Vyacheslav Popov is in charge of the rescue 
operation.Contact has already been established with the submarine and 
its crew. 
 
The press release claimed that the submarine carried no nuclear weapons, that its 
nuclear reactors had been shut down, and that radiation levels were normal.38  Of this 
information, the Russian navy could only know the following: that vessels were on the 
scene and that the Kursk carried no nuclear weapons.  At this point, communications may 
have been established, but they consisted of at most Morse code tapped on the hull.  
Sensors may have been lowered from the surface to detect radiation and the status of the 
reactors, but no information gathered in this fashion was made public in the government 
statements. 
This sort of information mismanagement may come back to haunt the military and 
the Russian government as a whole.  In the future, many Russians will regard any 
information released as false unless proven otherwise.  The Russian military cannot 
afford this.  During the crisis, polls reported that only two per cent of the public believed 
the military was being completely honest, showing that to a significant extent the 
problem already exists.39  A number of reporters have expressed (and some people on the 
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street have seconded) the theory that the reason for the multiple stories from official 
sources is that the entire operation is a cover up.  Many accounts in the press indicated 
that the initial Kursk media releases from the navy looked like a disinformation 
campaign gone wrong.40 
These types of public relations situations are new to Russia.  The navy must learn 
how to deal with them if it hopes to win the battle for public opinion.  If Russians do not 
want a strong navy, no amount of political action by the admirals will make it happen.  
The public will object, and it will prove much harder for the admirals to have their way.  
While the role of public opinion in the Russian budget process is small, it apparently has 
some effect.  Government leaders may prove unwilling to take political chances on 
unpopular programs.  Public influence will largely depend on the development of Russian 
democracy. 
 
3. Social and Leadership Conditions in the Navy 
Conditions in the navy are also a concern.  As noted above, because Russia is a 
more open society than was the Soviet Union, it is harder to keep secrets.  It has become 
obvious that living conditions in the Russian armed forces are poor.  This problem has 
potentially dire consequences. 
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In July 2000, forty-two conscripts from the large amphibious assault ship BDK-
101 deserted in the middle of the night.  There was no impending deployment or threat of 
combat.  They went straight to the fleet commanders office to seek protection from 
abuse.  The sailors complained that their superiors were beating them, not letting them 
eat, and forcing them to work in their off duty time.41 
There have been worse incidents.  One occurred on board an Akula-class attack 
submarine in 1998.  A conscript seized a weapon from a topside sentry and shot his way 
down to the torpedo room, killing seven crewmembers and the sentry along the way.  
Once in the torpedo room, he barricaded himself in but made no demands.  When 
authorities broke in to get him out, he was dead.  He had triggered a small explosion 
while trying to detonate a torpedo, and it killed him.  Most speculate that his reasons for 
doing this were poor conditions and abuse from his superiors.42 
Poor living conditions affect most Russian military personnel.  Navy veterans 
who traveled north during the Kursk disaster were appalled at conditions.  Houses were in 
dire need of repair.  Often there was no hot water.43 
One story reported by Ren TV in 1998 is particularly illustrative of the problem: 
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Sergey Bobchenkov would have been twenty-six years old now.  When he 
was twenty-five he hanged himself.  In his suicide note Sergey explained 
his act very laconically: I cannot support my family.  His wife Olga 
and her little son live in Bryansk with her parents.  Olga left Vidyayevo 
when the child was born.  Hot water and heating were often disconnected 
in the camp.  Because of the chronic delays in the payment of salaries, 
Sergey could not send money to his family.44 
 
Bobchenkov is not alone.  Some reports indicate that there are as many as five hundred 
suicides in the Russian military each year.  It is not only the poor living conditions, but 
hazingdedovshchinaas well.  Hazing is so severe that across Russia mothers have 
organized to provide draft-dodging advice and other information to keep their children 
out of the military.45 
In the Far East, the situation is both more dire and more embarrassing than 
elsewhere in Russia for three reasons.   
• The Pacific is further from the center and more easily ignored; 
• The Pacific has suffered frequent changes in both political and military 
leadership; and 
• Commanders who should have been looking after the needs of their sailors 
were only looking after themselves. 
 
The Pacific Fleet was plagued with admirals who were more concerned with their 
own financial well-being and standard of living than they were with making ends meet 
for their sailors.  Three recent cases of theft and fraud at the highest levels of the Pacific 
Fleet involved: 
                                                 
44 Yelena Fedorova, What Happened: Northern Fleet Personnel Reaching 
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• Admiral Igor Khmelnov, former commander of the Pacific Fleet and chief of 
the Main Naval Staff (a description of his case follows); 
• Vice Admiral Vyacheslav Kharnikov, former commander of the Kamchatka 
flotilla, accused of using 352 million rubles of navy money to build a vacation 
home on the Black Sea; and 
• Rear Admiral Nikolay Germanov, former commander of a submarine task 
force, accused of selling on the black market fuel provided to his unit. 
 
Admiral Khmelnovs case helps illustrate how social and economic problems are 
related.  Khmelnov took over the Pacific Fleet with a publicly proclaimed order from 
Moscow: Admiral Khmelnov willstart by solving the housing shortage.  It is an 
outrage that thousands of officers families are homeless!46  He had been involved, 
reports indicate, in corrupt activites since at least 1990.  Around that time, Admiral 
Khmelnov had his son (who himself had been tried three times for theft, fraud, and 
forgery) fraudulently signed up as a crewmember of a Pacific Fleet ship, so that the 
Admiral could provide a house for his sons family. 
This continued for some years, until the Admiral transferred to Vladivostok.  
When he left, he gave his official residence to his son.  Soon thereafter, the son 
privatized the housing, which belonged to the navy, and received a significant sum of 
money for it.  The son then followed his father to Vladivostok and moved into another 
furnished apartment in the best neighborhood in the cityat the navys expense. 
Simultaneously, the Admiral decided his lodging was too small, and ordered new 
quarters constructed in the most sumptuous building in Vladivostok.  Shortly after the 
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navy finished construction, Khmelnov transferred the apartments title from the navy to 
himself. 
When Khmelnov left Vladivostok to take over the main naval staff in Moscow, he 
moved his wife and daughter to Moscow. He left a farewell gift for his mistress: he 
renovated her apartment at a cost to the fleet of seventy million rubles.  The money came 
from the Pacific Fleet electric power funds.47 
Numerous examples show the lack of concern for the common Russian sailor at 
the highest levels of command.  In February 1999, the high command ordered the rations 
provided to both the army and the navy cut in half.  This orderMoscow hopedwould 
save much needed money.  Lower level commanders were not to issue any more food 
until specifically ordered.  When some of these commanders questioned the order and 
brought it to the attention of the military investigators, Moscow countermanded it.  It 
appears to be more proof that upper level leaders have priorities other than the well-being 
of their subordinates.48 
The results are what may be expected.  Submarine officersduring Soviet times 
considered the elite of the navyare leaving in droves.  Many of the reasons stem from 
the social and economic conditions in the Far East.  A seaman working on a fishing 
trawler earns three times as much as the commander of a submarine.  Officers frequently 
                                                 
47 Reznik. 
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report for duty in the morning, and then leave so they can go somewhere else to earn 
money for their families.49 
In a 1998 Izvestia survey of the army, 72.5 percent of officers and warrant officers 
reported that pay was irregular.  A majority reported two to four month delays as normal.  
Only 18.5 percent reportedly rely solely on their military pay for subsistence.  Over 55 
percent report some additional income.  Pay has improved since 1998, but problems 
linger.  Izvestia reported that the military seemed to be relying on enthusiasts alone.50  
Others report that in the navy, Those who have connections and possibilities 
leaveafter a year or two of service.  Those who stay are those who have nowhere to 
go.51  This is not the way to build an effective military.  Conditions will have to change 
if Russia is truly to build an all-volunteer force. 
 
4. Media 
Many of the domestic influences are political in nature, and depend on the course 
the Russian state charts in the near term.  In this respect, state policy regarding the media 
plays a vital role.  In the past year, Russian President Vladimir Putin has begun to 
neutralize the influence of some of the so-called oligarchs, men who profited 
immensely from the privatizations of Soviet state-owned enterprises.  Members of this 
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small group have had exceptional influence because of their wealth and political 
connections. 
A complete discussion of Putins actions against selected oligarchs is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  Some important aspects, however, warrant discussionfor instance, 
Putins assault on independent media, most vividly apparent in the NTV purchase. 
NTV was a privately owned television network controlled by Vladimir 
Gusinskys MEDIA-MOST conglomerate.  NTV was the newest and most professional 
nationwide station in Russia.  It was also Russias biggest privately owned television 
station, reaching over seventy per cent of the country.  Adding to its importance and 
value, NTV has its own satellite.  All other national stations rely on aging Soviet-era 
satellites.  This could prove to be a significant advantage in the future as the older 
satellites fail.  Unfortunately, launching this satellite caused significant financial 
difficulties for NTV.  This financial weakness was a major reason that Gazprom, the 
state-controlled natural gas monopoly, was able to buy NTV.   
It appears that the Putin regime is not tolerant of domestic criticism.  While Putin 
does profess that without free media, Russian democracy cannot survive and civil 
society cannot flourish, he has also said that a free press must respect limits.  The media 
cannot become a mass misinformation instrument for fighting the state.52  Some 
suggest that Gusinskys sale of NTV is part of a deal to avoid prosecution by the federal 
government.  Government control of NTV would signify government control of all 
                                                 
52 Putin quoted in Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva Introduction: The 
Political Framework, in Russian Media Empires VI, September 2000, Radio Free 
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significant nationwide television news.53  This would be a disaster for freedom of the 
press in Russia.54  Much of what is still independent supports the governments 
policies.  Table 1 shows the major media outlets, their owners, and their politics. 
Name Owner Politics 
 Television  
ORT State and Roman Abramovich Pro-Kremlin 
RTR State Pro-Kremlin 
NTV Gazprom Pro-Kremlin 
TV6 Boris Berezovsky Independent 
Ren TV UES (electricity monopoly) and Lukoil Kremlin-leaning 
TNT Gusinsky Independent 
Kultura State Pro-Kremlin 
Prometei Gazprom Pro-Kremlin 
 Radio  
Radio Rossiya State Pro-Kremlin 
Radio Mayak State Pro-Kremlin 
Ekho Moskvy Gusinsky Independent 
 Print  
Izvestia Prof-Media (part of Vladimir Potyanins 
Interrosgroup) 
Kremlin-leaning 
Kommersant Berezovsky Wobbling 
Komosomolskaya Prof-Media Kremlin-leaning 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta Berezovsky Pro-Kremlin 
Noviye Izvestia Berezovsky Independent 
Vedomosti Independent Media Group, Financial 
Times and Wall Street Journal 
Independent 
Table 1 Major Russian Newspapers, Radio, and Television Stations, Their Owners, and 
Politics.  From: The Economist, 21 April 2001, 46. 
 
Many institutions around the world have condemned the saleoften referred to as 
a "government takeover"of NTV.  Not only has Russia lost an important non-state-
controlled media outlet, it has also established the precedent of attacking media outlets 
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critical of the regime.  This may have a deterrent effect on those who would otherwise 
oppose the governments policies. 
The draft press bill released in mid-2000 substantiates this interpretation.  This 
legislation has the potential to strictly limit the freedom of the press.  The bill establishes 
a special ethics council to evaluate media coverage.  It requires news outlets to give equal 
time to opposing viewpoints, which is extremely difficult because the governments 
statements are usually either short or non-existent.  The bill also criminalizes any 
interviewer who takes advantage of [his] interviewees emotional state whose 
consequences he does not appreciate.55 
The Russian governments goals are much wider.  The stated goal of the new bill 
is to prepare Russia for future information attacks.  To support this policy, Russia 
introduced to the Council of Europe a proposal that, among other things, calls on foreign 
states to prevent international spread of information that is illegal inside another 
country.56 
The NTV takeover and the new draft press bill will reduce the effects of the 
domestic changesassuming restrictions on freedom of the press do not provoke 
revolution in Russia.  With less objective reporting the government is moving closer to 
the controlled environment of the Soviet Union.  Russian officials may be able to control 
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information flows more effectively than they have in recent years.  Information will still 
leak, but the average Russians access to it will be strictly limited. 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL CHANGES 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact were 
momentous occasions in world history.  They marked the end of the Cold War era.  The 
bi-polar world of East against West and Soviet Communism against Western Capitalism 
was no more.  This new world presented challenges to the Russian navys leaders.  They 
could no longer use this conflict to justify their continued existence.  Many believed 
Russia could thrive in the new world with a much smaller navy, designed for a much 
more limited role.  They based their theories on changes in the international order. 
This change and other factors (the independence of the former Soviet republics, 
and changes in foreign navies) combined to drive Russian naval policy in the period 
following the Cold War. 
 
1. Geography 
The geography of Russia is significantly different from that of the Soviet Union.  
As the Soviet Union fell apart, the constituent republics of the Soviet Union went their 
separate ways.  The central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikstan, and Kyrgyzstan) are of only marginal concern to the Russian Navy.  The 
republics in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) are similarly not of great 
concern to the Russian Navy.  These former Soviet republics concern the Russian Navy 
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only with respect to the Black and Caspian Seas..  But Russia lost territory important to 
the navy as well, most critically, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
a. Fleets 
Some of the most significant losses were around the Black Sea.  Most of 
the Soviet Navys bases there were in and around the Crimean Peninsula.  These bases 
are now in the Republic of Ukraine.  Russia has a lease on the main fleet base at 
Sevastopol.  Nevertheless, there are problems.  Every time the Black Sea fleet enters or 
leaves port, it must clear Ukrainian customs.57  Authorities in Ukraine have cut off power 
and water supplies to the bases because of unpaid bills.  The Russian Government is still 
disputing the legal status of the Sea of Azov with Ukraine as well.58 
The Baltic Sea Fleet suffered significantly from territorial changes.  The 
long coastlines of the three Baltic republicsLatvia, Lithuania, and Estoniaare no 
longer under Moscows control.  The Soviet Union had bases in East Germany, Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.  Russia now has only two naval bases in the Baltic: St 
Petersburg and Baltiysk (in the Kaliningrad oblast).59  Russians are also concerned about 
the relative decline in power of this fleet compared to others in the region.  In Russian 
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eyes, Germany and the Scandinavian countries are potential threats.  They are building 
their navies while Russias declines.60 
The Baltic and Black Seas are of special concern to Russia.  Both are 
important export routes.  They are also important to Russian tradition.  It took centuries 
of expansion for Imperial Russia to establish year-round access to the open ocean.  
Without guaranteed access through these two seas, Russias access to the open ocean will 
be severely restricted.  During winter, ice restricts easy access from the Northern Fleets 
home on the Kola Peninsula.  The Baltic and the Black Seas are themselves restricted in 
their access to the open ocean.  The Danish Straits restrict egress from the Baltic, and 
Turkeyhistorically among the rivals to Russiacould shut off access to the 
Mediterranean.61 
The Caspian Sea is also a concern.  The Soviet Union once dominated this 
inland sea.  Now, not only Russia and Iran, but Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistanall former Soviet Republicsborder the Caspian as well.  The reports on 
the size of the oil and natural gas deposits in the region are mixed, but many suggest that 
the deposits are enormous.  There are legal concerns over the status of territorial claims in 
the Caspian, and the natural resources make this a contentious issue.  Some 
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commentators have considered turning the entire Caspian Flotilla (now subordinate to the 
Black Sea Fleet) over to the border guards.62  In light of the navys current financial 
difficulties, it is argued, it might be wise to do this and concentrate on areas that are open 
to the ocean. 
The Pacific Fleet has weakened significantly.  The SSBNs in this fleet are 
the oldest in the navy.63  The other Pacific Fleet vessels are also old and suffer from their 
location.  Shipyards in European Russia built the most modern vessels in the Russian 
Navy.  Most of the repair facilities are in European Russia as well.  This is the case of the 
Admiral Lazarov.  This Ushakov-class cruiserbuilt in St. Petersburgis currently idle 
at the pier in Vladivostok awaiting repairs.  Only shipyards in European Russia can make 
major repairs.  This area has also seen significant political turmoil in civilian government 
and a rapid turnover of military leadership.64 
The Northern Fleet is in better shape than the others.  It lost no ports 
during the dissolution of the Soviet empire.  It is located in the same region as most of 
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Russias shipbuilding and repair facilities.  Most of Russias operational submarines
including the most modern onesare part of this fleet. 
b. Borders 
Soviet-era planning was not concerned with the internal borders of the 
Soviet Union.  This has caused huge problems for the newly independent states.  Some 
states, such as Kazakhstan, have significant oil and natural gas deposits, but inadequate 
facilities to refine them.  Some of the newly independent states only have the 
infrastructure to be raw material exporters.  Russia has not been immune to the problems 
caused by the realignment of borders following the Soviet Unions collapse.  The navy 
has had difficulties fixing some ships because of this.  The factories that produce some of 
the parts for ships and aircraft are now in foreign countries.  The dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact raised even more concerns.  Shipyards in the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany) and communist Poland built some of Russias ships.  The German 
Democratic Republic no longer exists.  Its territory became part of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (and NATO) in October 1990, while Poland was admitted to NATO in 
March 1999.65 
 
2. World Naval Developments 
Russian naval leaders have expressed concern regarding the deterioration of the 
naval balance of power in critical regions.  Russian admirals are concerned that they have 
not been able to conduct enough nuclear deterrent patrols and out of area operations.  In 
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the opinion of these admirals, some nations are still conducting such operations against 
Russia, despite the end of the Cold War.66 
More distressingly, the Russian Navys strength relative to that of its rivals is in 
decline.  In 1997, Russia considered only eighteen percent of its vessels ocean going.  
Russian admirals have stated that if current trends are not reversed, before long the 
Russian Navy will have only half the combat power of Sweden and one quarter that of 
Germany in the Baltic, and one half that of Turkey in the Black Sea.  In 1997, these 
admirals stated that Japan already had a three to one advantage over Russia in surface 
combatants and equality with Russia in the number of attack submarines in the Pacific.67  
These ratios are probably more unfavorable to Russia today. 
Russia still considers the United States and NATO potential adversaries.  Russian 
admirals cite the presence of American submarines carrying precision-guided weapons 
nearand, in the Russian view, inRussian territorial waters as a threat.  In 1995 
Admiral Oleg Yerofeev, then commander of the Northern Fleet, stated that three to four 
nuclear-powered attack submarines of these same states [the United States and Britain] 
are on constant patrol in the waters of the Barents Sea.  These U.S. and British 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Radiy Zubkov, The Navy We Lost: The Russian Navy is Greeting Its Tri-
centennial Jubilee Seriously Ill, NVO, 1 January 1996, reported and translated by 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28 March 1997, FTS 19970328000664. 
66 Oleg Yerofeev, We Must ReformWe Must Not Destroy: The Northern Fleet 
Must Be Preserved as a Powerful Operational-Strategic Formation, NVO, 22 April 1995, 
reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 22 April 1995, 
FTS 19950422000037. 
67 Valeri Aleksin, Russian Navy Enters New Stage of Reforms: Navymen Hope 
Erroneous Decisions Will be Precluded, NVO, 26 July-1 August 1997, reported and 
translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 11 August 1997, FTS 
19970811000322. 
 44
submarines can launch long-range cruise missiles, Yerofeev declared, whose impact 
zone includes hundreds of cities, including Moscow.weapons whose effectiveness can 
be compared only to nuclear weapons.68 
Russian naval leaders contend that the West in general and the United States in 
particular believe that war is still a valid foreign policy option.  The shift in U.S. naval 
policy away from blue water fleet-against-fleet actions to power-projection fleet-
against-shore actions has caused concern.  According to two Russian Navy Captains, 
the American military command is considering the possibility of organizing and waging 
the primary operations right in the offshore waters of the enemy from the very beginning 
of a war.69  Russias relative naval weakness makes U.S. naval doctrine more 
frightening in Russian eyes.  Russias naval leaders fear that if the decline of the Russian 
Navy is not arrested and reversed quickly, Russia will be vulnerable to a debilitating 
conventional preemptive strike. 
Russian reactions to these perceived threats are evident in the doctrinal changes 
noted below.  How seriously Russia perceives this threat (and how likely compared to 
other conflicts) will determine its effects upon the navy. 
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C. DOCTRINAL CHANGES 
Russia proclaims that it has no enemies.  However, the latest military doctrine and 
National Security Concept reveal certain preoccupations. 
The National Security Concept lists the causes of the fundamental threats in the 
international sphere to Russian security, including: 
• the desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of 
existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United 
Nations and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe]; 
• the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATOs 
eastward expansion; [and] 
• the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences 
in immediate proximity to Russian borders.70 
 
With these as the potential threats, doctrinally the future may seem to offer great tasks for 
the Russian Navy.  It appears that while the National Security Concept gives lip service 
to the new multi-polar world environment, Russian military authorities are really 
looking at the world in the same East-West manner as before.  For potential conflict with 
a distant sea power, a strong navy would seem vital. 
The Russian Maritime Policy supports these views.  According to The Principles 
of Russian Federation Policy in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period Through the 
Year 2010, among Russias key interests in the World Ocean are: 
• excluding discriminatory actions in regard to it [Russia] or its allies on the 
part of individual states or military-political blocs; [and] 
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• disallowing the dominance of any state or military-political bloc in those 
expanses of the world ocean which have significance for realizing the Russian 
Federations state interests, particularly in contiguous seas.71 
 
The United States and NATO are evidently the targets of these points.  Russian naval 
leaders also fear that they are falling behind their competitors.  They believe that there 
have been changes in the ratio of naval forces not in favor of the Russian Federation; 
improvements in the combat abilities of naval groupings of the leading foreign states, 
and that Russian naval arms [are] trailing behind qualitative and quantitative indicators 
of the arms of foreign states at an increased rate.72  The new maritime policy conveys 
the impression that Russia is on the brink of naval disaster. 
The doctrine indicates that Russia is extremely concerned about instability in its 
border regions and the near abroad: the former Soviet republics.  It sees threats to its 
security from economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion by neighboring 
states into Russian territory, and increased activity by cross-border organized crime and 
also by foreign terrorist organizations.73 
Russias Military Doctrine goes into more detail.  On its list of major threats to 
security are the following:  
• illegal activities by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist 
movements, organizations, and structures aimed at violating the unity and 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and destabilizing the domestic 
political situation in the country; 
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• the planning, preparation, and implementation of operations aimed at 
disrupting the functioning of federal organs of state power and attacking state, 
economic, or military facilities, or facilities related to vital services or the 
information infrastructure; 
• the creation, equipping, training, and functioning of illegal armed 
formations;[and] 
• organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other illegal activities on a scale 
threatening the Russian Federations military security.74 
 
This list suggests that Russia is severely concerned with the conditions along its 
southern border.  The two wars with Chechen separatists are part of this concern.  
There is a smoldering conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Relations with Ukraine 
and Turkeywhile now goodcould sour.  The legal situation regarding the Caspian 
Sea and its oil and gas reserves is unsettled.  Russians fear that the Taliban will spread its 
brand of Islamic fundamentalism up from Afghanistan through the newly independent 
central Asian stateswhich are Russias allies in the Commonwealth of Independent 
Statesand into Russia itself.  The writings of influential Russian politicians reinforce 
this outlook.75 
Russians perceive these near abroad and associated issues as real threats to 
Russias security.  In none of them would a strong sea-going navy be of much use.  If 
Moscow continues to see such conflicts as the main threats, the Russian Navy will 
continue to suffer.  The debate will center on what is the true threat to the Russian 
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Federation: foreign military-political alliances, or ethnic separatism and instability on the 
southern borders.  The results of this debate will help determine which path the 
government selects for the Russian Navy: coastal defense and a small force, or a larger 
force for operations on the open ocean.  The latter course would evidently imply greater 
investments in the submarine fleet. 
 
D. THE BALKANS 
Generals have told me that we must build a monument to Clinton because 
the campaign over Kosovo drastically changed political attitudes here.  
Now there is no more opposition to the idea that Russia should restore its 
military potential. 
Alexander Zhlin, Russian military correspondent.76 
 
This statement regarding NATOs military operation against Yugoslavia demonstrates 
how critical it was to Russian military thinking.  Russians interpreted NATOs 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict as proof of two of their beliefs: 
• NATO is dangerous, and has not changed its anti-Russian ways; and 
• NATO operations in Kosovo set a dangerous precedent for interventionary 
operations. 
 
Other issues surrounding the Kosovo campaign also soured NATO-Russian relations.  
One of the major concernsstated in both the military doctrine and National Security 
Conceptwas that by not going to the United Nations Security Council for approval of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Defense Policy Towards the Year 2000, 26 March 1997, [http] Available online: 
www.mis.nps.navy.mil/nsa/Arbatov.html, [Accessed 22 January 2001]. 
76 Zhlin quoted in Stephen J. Blank, Threats to Russian Security: The View from 
Moscow (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 1. 
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the Kosovo operation,  the NATO allies circumvented Russias interpretation of 
international law.  Russians see their importance in the world as directly related to their 
seat on the United Nations Security Council.  Russia can no longer rely on the Warsaw 
Pact to bolster its power.  Because of its faltering economy, Russias role as a superpower 
now lies only with its seat on the U.N. Security Council and its nuclear arsenal.  Moscow 
will likely view any threat to either of these assets very seriously. 
There is also the fear that this type of operation may be just the first of its kind: 
It is not unlikely that NATO could use or even organize crises similar to 
that in Kosovo in other areas of the world to create an excuse for military 
intervention[,] since the policy of double standards where the blocs 
interests dictate the thrust of policy (the possibility of the use of military 
force in Kosovo against the Yugoslav Army and simultaneous disregard 
for the problem of genocide faced by the Kurds in Turkey, [and] the 
manifestation of concern at the use of military force in the Dniester 
Region, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh) is typical of the alliances 
actions.77 
 
Some Russians fear that NATO might try to conduct a Kosovo-type operation against 
them. 
At first glance, one might assume that the lower Russian-NATO and Russian-
American relations sink, the better off the Russian submarine force will be in the 
competition for military budget resources.  The recent espionage developments and 
Russian reactions to U.S. missile defense proposals (among other issues) indicate that 
political conditions may be improving for the Russian submarine force.  Statements such 
as the following from Igor Sergeev, then Defense Minister, however, do not bode well: 
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We must concentrate our military in central Asia because of military instability caused 
by the Taliban and others.78 
 
E. ECONOMIC ISSUES 
There can be no doubt that the economic decline of Russia has affected the navy.  Of 
all the causes of the Russian Navys plight, economics have had the largest role.  The 
economic decline has had numerous effects: 
• Wage arrears, 
• Reduced ship construction, 
• Limited operations, 
• Lower standards of living, 
• Missed maintenance, and 
• Increased competition from other military services for scarce resources. 
 
This list is far from comprehensive.  The problems posed by these issues are not 




The Russian defense budgeting process is significantly different from that in the 
United States.  In fact, the concept of a defense budget is different as well.  Normally a 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Moscow, NVO 6 November 1998, FBIS-SOV, 9 November 1998, quoted in 
Ibid., 8. 
78 Sergeev quoted in Teruaki Ueno, North Korea could cut military force
Russias Sergeev, Reuters, 29 November 2000, reported by Johnsons Russia List 
#4660, 29 November 2000. 
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defense budget consists of items such as the following: personnel wages, operations, 
procurement, military construction, maintenance, training, and research and development.  
Some states include recruiting, pensions, civil defense, and environmental clean up.  The 
Russian budget is different.  Officially, the Russian military budget contains seven items: 
• Maintenance of armed forces, 
• Procurement, 
• Research and Development, 
• Military construction, 
• Pensions, 
• Military projects within the Ministry of Atomic Energy, and 
• Maintenance of mobilization capacities.79 
 
Most experts regard this list as insufficient.  Reality is different from what the law 
mandates.  Most experts add the following five categories at a minimum: 
• Budgets of other federation ministries and state agencies that field their own 
quasi-military units (24 mini armies such as the railroad troops, internal 
ministry troops, etc.), 
• Disarmament in compliance with international arms control treaties, 
• Federal assistance for conversion of defense enterprises to civilian purposes, 
• Military assistance to fellow Commonwealth of Independent States members, 
and 
• Other smaller expenses.80 
 
The proliferation of armed forces outside the Ministry of Defense is a result of 
political infighting in Russia and attempts to weaken the political power of the military 
services.81  This would be roughly equivalent to the federal government of the United 
                                                 
79 Boris Jelezov, Defense Budgeting and Civilian Control of the Military in the 
Russian Federation, ed., T. P. M. Barnett and H. H. Gaffney (Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1997), 9-11. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Russian Military Reforms Come Unstuck as Nuclear Deterrence Gains Upper 
Hand, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 January 2000, provided by BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 13 January 2000, accessed via Lexis-Nexis, 15 March 2001. 
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States funding all state national guards, the coast guard, a significant portion of state and 
local police forces, and a good portion of many civilian industries through the defense 
budget. 
The budgeting process is different as well.  Like the United States Congress, the 
Russian legislature is responsible for approving the budget.  The budget results from 
negotiations and debate both in the parliament and the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation.  The Security Council consists of the President, the Secretary of the Security 
Council, the chairmen of both chambers of the federal assembly, and the Prime Minister.  
The Security Ministers (the Defense Minister and the Interior Minister), the Minister of 
Foreign Trade, and the Minister of Finance usually attend the meetings by invitation.82  
On the surface, this is similar to the process in the United States.  The executive branch 
develops a draft budget that the legislature amends and approves. 
Once it approves the defense budget, however, the parliament loses all control.  
The money goes en bloc to the government.  The Security Council and the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, have exclusive control over how to distribute 
that money.  Technically the Security Council can distribute this money any way it likes 
without parliamentary oversight.  After the budget passes, the Security Council retains 
the right to amend it without the consent of parliament.83  This arrangement severely 
limits the influence of legislators in military decision-making.  Nominally, they have the 
power of the purse, but in reality, their importance is miniscule.  This arrangement 
greatly resticts parliamentary oversight of the defense budget and hence defense policy.  
                                                 
82 Jelezov, 40. 
83 Jelezov, 44. 
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Reformers in Parliament have little ability to influence policy, leaving reform in the 
hands of bureaucrats. 
A good snapshot of the navys financial straits is the year 1999.  The defense 
budget that year allocated the navy 29.1 percent of its declared requirements.  Of this, the 
navy received only 70.6 percent.  The result was that in 1999 the Russian Navy received 
only 20.5 percent of its declared need.84 
Navy size halved over the period from 1991 to 1999.85  This mitigates the funding 
losses somewhat, but not completely.  Support for Forces (pay to sailors) for 1999 went 
up by 17.9 percent over 1998; however, it is only 39.1 percent of the 1993 level.  
Payments for Arms and Military Equipment (including procurement and repairs to 
industrial infrastructure) dropped 33.8 percent from 1998 and were only 13.2 percent of 
the 1992 level.  Research and Development went up 3.2 times compared to the 1998 
level but was only 31.3 percent of the 1992 level.  Support for Major Construction and 
Repairs was 17.7 percent of the 1992 level.  This last item has been increasing since 
1997, but most of the money has gone to address the housing shortage, not to build and 
repair ships.  The overall trend has been to shift money away from operations and 
acquisition and towards support for the troops: in either pay or improved standards of 
living.86 
                                                 
84 I. Shevchenko, No MoneyBut the Fleet Lives, Morskoy Sbornik, 6 June 
2000, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 July 2000, 
CEP 20000714000322. 
85 Aleksin, Navy Enters New Stage of Reform. 
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This is a dangerous trend for the navy.  While conditions for the average Russian 
sailor may seem to be improving, pulling money away from operations and maintenance 
makes each vessel and aircraft in the navy less effective and less safe.  The effect on 
combat capability is obvious.  If the crews do not train at sea, their chances of 
survivingmuch less effectively conductingcombat operations are that much lower. 
 
2. Direct Results of the Financial Crisis 
Combat is not the only danger.  Some Russian experts speculate that one possible 
cause of the Kursk disaster was crew error.  Russian submarine crews spend the majority 
of their time in port.  There is not enough money to send them to sea regularly.  
Neglected training has hurt the Russian Navy in the past.  When the submarine 
Komsomolets sank off Norway in 1989, training deficiencies significantly hurt the crews 
chances for survival.  Rear Admiral Senatsky (former head of the Russian Navy rescue 
service) has described what happened: 
[Life rafts] were located within the conning tower, and had yellow-colored 
openings marked life raft.  To release one, you had to pull a lever in the 
opening, and the raft would be automatically disengaged.  But when the 
accident happened, no member of the crew knew how to handle the life 
rafts.  The chief mate ordered his men to use crowbars to knock them out.  
And so they did  knocking out both the rafts and the automatic operation 
system.87 
 
                                                 
87 Senatsky quoted in Marina Kotelnikova, They Go To Fight, Not to Save 
Themselves, Moscow News, 23 August 2000, accessed via Lexis-Nexis 25 October 
2000. 
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Vladimir Putin has summed up the conditions in the navy.  These accidents will continue 
to happen when pilots do not fly and sailors do not go to sea.88 
American experts agree with this sentiment.  They have written for years that 
Russian training deficiencies risked an accident like the Kursk disaster.  The Russian 
Navy routinely conducts complex, multi-ship exercises after long slack periods.  The 
crews have little chance to get used to operating ships and submarines under normal 
conditions, before they have to do it under arduous conditions in company with many 
other ships.89 
If money for maintenance is short, each time a submarine, ship, or aircraft leaves 
port, it is putting the lives of those onboard and nearby at risk.  Every year the 
government delivers insufficient funds for maintenance the situation gets worse.  More 
and more money will be required in the future to repair the ships.  Many will probably 
never go to sea again.90 
The navy has tried to deal with the budget crises through targeted cuts in ship 
numbers.  The navys leaders realized that with declining budgets they could not maintain 
                                                 
88 Putin quoted in Vasiliy Zakharov, The Andreyevskiy Flag will Remain in the 
World Ocean, Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 August 2000, reported and translated by Foreign 
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the same force level they had under the Soviet Union.  They therefore kept the most 
modern and capable vessels in service, and decommissioned the older ones.  This left the 
navy a battle force with an average age between twelve and seventeen years.  This is a 
relatively young and capable force on paper.  This is not the whole story, however.  
The true measure of combat readiness depends on more than ship ages and ship types.  
With reductions in training, maintenance, and repair budgets, the service life of ships will 
go down, as will their combat readiness.  According to Admiral Nikolai Konorev, the 
Deputy Chief of the Navy Main Command, the navys combat power on the open ocean 
has declined by forty to fifty percent since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Without a 
significant increase in funding, Konorev added, the navy in 2010 will have only one 
hundred to one hundred twenty ships in five theaters.91 
What the admirals have selected to cut is also an issue.  There have been 
complaints that the admirals want to command a fleet that looks good, despite 
operational shortcomings.  They have kept the high-profile shipssurface combatants 
and submarinesat the expense of needed support capability.  The first systems 
neglected were the emergency and logistics systems.  These choices can have devastating 
consequences.  During the Kursk rescue operation, no Russian rescue vessel was able to 
make it to the scene.  While some rescue ships were on the active list, they were not in 
adequate material condition to make the voyage.92 
                                                 
91 Konorev quoted in Aleksin, Economy. 
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This type of decision-making is not new.  It was common during Soviet times as 
well.  From the beginning of the Soviet submarine force, the emphasis was always on 
operations and construction, which got priority over maintenance and overhauls.  It 
frequently took five to eight years between the deployment of a new technology on a 
submarine and the construction of the facilities necessary to maintain it.  Safety and 
maintaining the quality of the environment fell even lower on the table of priorities.  The 
Soviet Navy deployed its first nuclear-powered vessel in 1958.  The first facility to 
handle radioactive waste was not established until the mid-1960s.  Handling and 
maintenance facilities for the Typhoon-class SSBNs (introduced in 1981) have yet to be 
completed.93  With the lack of money even for operations, it should be no surprise that 
the Russian Navy still ignores support facilities. 
Lack of money for fuel forces the navy to routinely cancel operations.  The 
disaster of the Kursk has only made things worse.  It forced the cancellation of the 
Mediterranean patrol planned for 2000.  The navy could not afford to replace the fuel 
used during the search, rescue, and recovery efforts.  The extra sea time expended by 
ships that had been scheduled to travel south resulted in their being overdue for shipyard 
repairs.  The recovery effort itself also consumed much of the money needed for the 
Mediterranean cruise.  The weak economic condition of the Russian Navy cannot deal 
with unanticipated costs.  The Pacific Fleet, for example,  had to cancel its 2000 Navy 
Day ship parade because there was not enough fuel.94 
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Financial conditions have gotten so bad that Russia has gone to desperate 
measures to fund its navy.  It is common for ship crews to subsidize their own budgets.  
Many do this by growing food and fishing to provide rations.  Officers and men alike 
must moonlightthat is, undertake remunerative work outside their official naval 
employmentto make money for their own subsistence. 
Regional governments have gotten involved.  It is a common for a region to 
subsidize a ships budget.  The Kursk regional government began to subsidize the 
submarine Kursk in 1997.  Almost all of Russias submarines have such sponsors.  In 
addition to money, the Kursk regional government arranged to send its best conscripts to 
the submarine.  The regional government constructed housing for the Kursks officers 
and men.  Kursk area resorts provided vacations to sailors from the Kursk.  Moscows 
mayor, Yuri Luzkhov, pledged to help fund construction of the Yuri Dolgoruki, the new 
design SSBN, as well as to pay for fuel for the Northern Fleet.95 
Similarly, the Mordovia and Archangel regions have begun collecting money to 
repair the cruiser Admiral Ushakov.  The navy originally planned to scrap the ship 
because there was not enough money to repair her.  Public outcry led the navy to change 
the plan and the government assigned one billion rubles for her repair.  The repairs will 
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still require at least another three billion rubles.  The regions have begun to accept 
donations from citizens to save the ship.96 
These are positive developments that demonstrate the publics support for the 
navy.  However, they will not provide the answer to the navys financial problems.  The 




Since 1998, there have been promising signs in the Russian economy.  In 2000, 
average per capita income in Russia rose 32.5 percent.  The recovery is the result of three 
main factors: 
• The rising price for oil and gas on the world market, 
• The payment of wage and pension arrears, and the 
• 1998 devaluation of the ruble.97 
 
The first factor is the most important.  Natural resources are the foundation of the 
Russian economy.  Energy exports (crude oil and natural gas) made up 48.2 percent of 
Russias exports in 1999.  Combined with metals and timber products, these raw 
materials make up over two thirds of Russias total exports.98  While high oil prices have 
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helped Russias economy, there is no guarantee that they will remain high.  Oil prices are 
notoriously unstable.  A decline in their market value could devastate the Russian 
economy. 
Income derived from raw material exports helped the Russian government repay 
wage and pension arrears.  This in turn helped stimulate the economy by putting money 
into workers hands, and allowing them to make purchases with cash instead of barter.  
The devaluation gave Russians more incentive to purchase from domestic producers 
because the prices of imported goods increased.  This stimulated domestic production, 
furthering the growth of the economy. 
A different aspect of the economic downturn relates to the defense industrial base.  
In the past several years, Russia has not ordered, paid for, or had delivered many new 
ships.  Along with the problems this causes for the Russian Navy today, it has negative 
implications for its future.  If the shipyards that build submarines do not get work, the 
workers will go to other industries.  It will take years to rebuild the perishable skills 
needed in submarine construction.  This very problem was a concern in the United States 
at the end of the Cold War.  The Russians are concerned about the problem, but seem to 
be developing a solution along lines different from those pursued by the United States.  
The Russians appear to be trying to keep the shipyards in operation by building for the 
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foreign market.  This may not generate enough income to solve the navys financial 
problems, but it may keep the shipyards active and their workers skills current.99 
 
4. Economic Side Effects 
Since funds are short, competition for them is keen.  One of the most public 
examples of this battle does not involve the navy directly, but is illustrative of the 
problem.  The Chief of the General Staff, General Anatolyi Kvashnin, and the then-
Defense Minister, Marshal Igor Sergeev, had a very public dispute over the direction of 
military reform in 1997-2001.  Sergeev, a former commander of the Strategic Rocket 
Forces, pushed for drastic cuts to the ground forces and more reliance on strategic nuclear 
forces for Russias defense.  General Kvashnin, an army general, countered that the 
strategic nuclear forces were too large, and that defense investments should center on the 
ground forces.  This conflict mirrors a conflict among civilian experts about the same 
issues.  The replacement of Sergeev by a new minister of defense, Sergey Ivanov, in 
March 2001 has not resolved this debate over military priorities. 
According to Nikolai Sokov, the two schools of nuclear strategy in Russia are the 
maximalists and the minimalists.  The minimalists hold that nuclear weapons play only a 
small role in national defense and foreign policy.  They are useful for deterring both 
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nuclear strikes and large scale conventional attacks against the homeland.  Minimalists 
view nuclear weapons as a form of national insurance policy.  They have an important 
but limited role.  Russia should therefore have a reasonably sized nuclear arsenal.  In 
contrast, maximalists tend to put more emphasis on nuclear weapons and to assign them 
more roles because they hold that nuclear weapons can be useful in a variety of conflicts, 
both global and regional.  They fear that if Russias nuclear arsenal is too small, 
the United States would use its theoretical ability to defeat Russia in a 
nuclear war to chip away at its interests and geopolitical positions. Nuclear 
inferiority would weaken Russia's ability to resist because it would not be 
able to up the ante in an (inevitable?) brinkmanship game.100 
 
Thus, according to the maximalists, Russia needs a large nuclear arsenal to guarantee its 
international position. 
While cloaked in the rhetoric of national defense, this dispute has been truly a 
battle for money.  The Soviet days of disproportionate defense spending are gone.  All 
the services now realize that they are in competition with the others for a much more  
limited defense budget.  The amount of money available is smaller, so the competition is 
keener.  When one service is the focus of national defense, the others will suffer.  This 
situation is particularly ominous for the navy, which has historically been a poor 
relation in the Ministry of Defense.101 
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The navy has not been immune to these battles.  In late 1998, Colonel General 
Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops, proposed that 
Russia set up a Joint Main Command for strategic deterrence.  This plan would 
subordinate the nuclear forces of the air force and the navy to a unified command.  The 
unified command would be set up and commanded by the commander-in-Chief of the 
Strategic Missile Troops.  This proposal was obviously threatening to the autonomy and 
status of navy and air force commanders.102  With the recent leadership changes in the 
Ministry of Defense, there appears little chance of this proposal's adoption. 
 
F. THE EFFECTS 
Overall, the effects of these changes have been acute.  The Russian submarine 
force has shrunk.  It has struggled to maintain an operational capability.  Its numbers 
have dropped by more a factor of five.  The quality of life for those servingnever good 
by NATO standardshas gotten worse.  The following figures summarize the results of 
these effects.  Not only has the number of active submarines fallenfrom 365 in 1984 to 
277 in 1991 to around 64 in 2000submarine construction has plummeted as well
from 15 in 1984 to 27 in 1991 to 6 in 2000.  Low construction rates alone are not an 
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indication of impending disaster.  Low construction rates combined with low 
maintenance rates and a distinct lack of political will are.103 






























Figure 1 Active submarines by Year, 1984-2000. 
 
                                                 
103 Jane Fighting Ships (London: Janes Publishing Company, Limited, 1984-
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provided by Janes for the jump in SSN construction around 1990.  The most plausible 
explanation is that the editors at Janes were adjusting to new information that became 
available as the Cold War ended, and expressing limited confidence in its accuracy, with 
due qualifications.  This is supported by Janes frequent use of ? to denote construction 
before this time.  If this is the case, the pre-1990 numbers may be significantly higher. 
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Figure 2 Submarine Construction by Year, 1984-2000. 
 
A side effect of the size reduction has been modernization.  The composition of the 
submarine force is much more modern than it was in 1984, or even 1990, as measured by 
the averate age of the remaining submarines.  Outdated classes are gone.  All the non-
nuclear-powered ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines have been retired.  The 
balance has shifted towards larger, more capable, nuclear-powered submarines.  Figure 3 





























Figure 3 Submarine Force Composition, 1984 and 2000. 
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IV. FUTURE MISSIONS AND POLICY TRENDS 
 
The future may not look bright for the Russian Navy in general, but there are definite 
reasons why it may be expected survive.  For over thirty-five years, the Russian Navy has 
carried a portion of the states nuclear weapons.  This will likely not change.  The 
Russian Navy could undertake other missions in the event of conflict with foreign 
adversaries or in support of international conflict management efforts (e.g. embargo 
enforcement).  Russia has issued plans for the development of the navy. 
Whatever future roles the navy undertakes, one seems assured: nuclear deterrence.  
In the past, this role has been a central mission of the Soviet/Russian Navy. 
 
A. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
Deterring nuclear has been a primary mission for Moscows navy for decades.  
While the navy grew large over the course of the Cold War, its most powerful strike 
capabilities resided in the nuclear deterrence force of the SSBNs.  The Soviet Navy 
possessed limited ability to project conventional power against the NATO allies, in 
particular the United States.  As William Odom has noted, 
The core of the Soviet Navy became the more than sixty submarines 
equipped with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, SSBNs.  Another roughly 
three hundred submarines constituted a significant force, but not one 
capable of operations in the central Atlantic or Pacific oceans.  The 
SSBNs were deployed only in the Northern and Pacific Fleets.The 
predominant power of the Soviet Navy was in the Northern and Pacific 
Fleets to defend the SSBNs with their intercontinental nuclear striking 
power. 104 
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Since its 1993 military doctrine Russia has endorsed nuclear deterrence as a key 
element of its security policy.  The goal of Russian Federation policy regarding nuclear 
weapons is to remove the threat of nuclear war by deterring its initiation against the 
Russian Federation and its allies.105 
All sources indicate that nuclear deterrence will continue to be a central mission 
of the Russian Navy.  In the next ten years the Russian Navys focus will be on 
developing these forces.  According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral 
Vladimir Kuroyedov, 
the role of the naval nuclear forces will increase.Not only because the 
START-2 treaty has been ratified but given that the naval nuclear forces 
have a full advantage and are an ideal means for the countrys leadership 
in the realization of the strategic nuclear containment policy.106 
In part because of these considerations, in mid-1998 the Russian Security Council 
decided to shift to greater reliance on the submarine-based nuclear forces.  By 2010 
Russia plans to base one half of its nuclear deterrent at sea.107  The shift towards a sea-
based deterrent is required by the START II treaty.  It requires that no later than 2003, the 
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107 Russian Navy to Carry Half of Nuclear Missiles by 2010, Interfax, 14 July 
1998, reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 July 
1998, FTS 19980714001093. 
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total number of warheads shall be limited to between 3,000 and 3,500.  The treaty 
requires distribution as follows: 
• A number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed 
SLBMs. 
• Zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than 
one warhead is attributed.108 
This differs substantially from the historic ratios.  Since the early 1960s, about 
sixty-five per cent of strategic warheads have been land based on ICBMs.  Ten per cent 
were air-launched, and twenty-five per cent were on SSBNs.109 
The focus on submarine-based nuclear deterrence has not been widely accepted.  
Even under Soviet rule, Russia never defined itself as a maritime power like the United 
States or Britain.  Moscows predilection towards ground-based forces still exists.  
Historically the Soviet Union never maintained more than thirty per cent of its SSBN 
force at sea at any one time.  Today, Russia does not even approach this level.  This 
leaves a large percentage of the submarine-based nuclear deterrent in port at any time. 
                                                 
108 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, (hereafter START II 
Treaty), 3 January 1993, [http] Available online: 
www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start2/st2text.htm, [Accessed 7 May 7, 2001], 
Article I, paragraphs 3, 4(a-b). 
109 Vladimir Davydov, Interview with Major-General Vladimir Semenovich 
Belous, Geopolitics: Cold War Arsenal, Granitsa Rossii, 01 November 1995, reported 
and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 01 November 1995, FTS 
19951101000572; S. Mezentsev and V. Vostrikov, New Views on the Application of 
U.S. and NATO Naval Forces, Morskoy Sbornik, April 1995, reported and translated by 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 June 1997, FTS 19970603002025.  For 
comparision, over fifty percent of START-accountable United States warheads are 
maintained on SLBMs. 
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Some Russian SSBNs have been conducting their deterrent patrols while 
remaining at the pier.  They are either no longer fit for submerged patrols, or there are 
insufficient funds to send them to sea.110  While these pier-side operations add to the 
number of warheads on alert at any time, these warheads are much less survivable than 
warheads aboard an SSBN at sea.  The main advantage of an SSBN on patrol at sea is 
that its location is in doubt, thereby making a first nuclear strike risky for a potential 
adversary.  SSBNs on patrol ensure that a retaliatory strike is always possible. 
In fact, depending on the number of warheads involved, an SSBN on alert in port 
can be regarded as even more vulnerable and destabilizing than a MIRVed ICBM on 
alert.  One reason the START II treaty eliminated MIRVed ICBMs was that most 
American experts consider them destabilizing, especially at lower total warhead levels.111  
By launching first against an enemys fixed, MIRVed ICBMs, the standard argument 
holds, an aggressive nation could devastate its enemys nuclear arsenal, thereby limiting 
the possibility for retaliation.  By this logic, an SSBN at the pier could be an even more 
lucrative and tempting target.  A single incoming warhead could hypothetically destroy 
the entire submarine, with all its warheads.  This analysis assumes that a MIRVed ICBM 
contains approximately ten warheads, while a fully loaded SSBN could carry as many as 
                                                 
110 Valeri Aleksin, The Navy Will Not Let Us Down, NVO, 24-30 July 1998, 
reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 24 July 1998, FTS 
19980724000499. 
111 START II Treaty, Article I, paragraph 4(b). 
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200 warheads.112  On the positive side, conducting deterrent patrols while remaining at 
the pier will reduce the stress on SSBN hulls, and thereby lengthen their service life. 
Russias new military and national security policies have underscored the 
importance of nuclear weapons, and appear to lower the thresholds for their use.113  The 
nuclear deterrence mission suggests that the navy will continue to be relevant to Russian 
security. 
The focus on nuclear deterrence has had distorting effects.  The Russian Navy has 
focused on this mission so intently that other branches of the navy have suffered.  In 
1998, a Russian commentator wrote that this assessment had been 
confirmed by the forced decision of the RF [Russian Federation] Navy 
command to redistribute funds earmarked for general-purpose naval forces 
in favor of nuclear powered missile submarines and on a five-year 
suspension of new submarine and surface ship construction.114 
The future of Russias strategic nuclear forces is still uncertain.  To some extent it 
depends on the policies the United States undertakes in the next few years.  Decisions 
about missile defense capabilities and NATO expansion are very sensitive.  U.S. missile 
                                                 
112 The assumption uses a Typhoon-class SSBN, carrying 20 SS-N-20 missiles, 
each fitted with ten warheads (the maximum number it was tested with).  (1999) R-
39/SS-N-20 STURGEON [http] Nuclear Forces Guide, Federation of American 
Scientists, Available online: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/r39.htm, [accessed 18 
April 2001]; (1999) R-36M/SS-18 SATAN [http] Nuclear Forces Guide, Federation of 
American Scientists, Available online: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36m.htm, 
[accessed 18 April 2001]. 
113 See discussion in Chapter III 
114 Radiy Zubkov, Uncertain Future of Missile Submarines: The State, Not the 
Military Department Should Determine the Fate of Russias Naval Strategic Forces, 
NVO, 11-17 December 1998, reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, 17 December 1998, FTS 19981217000130. 
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defense decisions will cause Russia to reevaluate its strategic nuclear forces.  Moscow 
may decide to add to its nuclear arsenal.  Production of the newest ICBM, the Topol-M 
(NATO designation SS-27), could be accelerated.  Russia would probably also insist that 
any future arms control treaty allow MIRVed ICBMs.  Expanding NATO eastward 
would make Russians nervous because in their eyes a perceived hostile alliance would be  
moving closer to the homeland.115 
The composition of the Russian nuclear deterrent has been the subject of political 
infighting among the services.  Each of them (the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, and 
the Air Force) demands a share of the arsenal.  There have been several political battles 
waged over these forces.116  The battle has had other implications as well.  Admiral Oleg 
Yerofeev, while commander of the Northern Fleet, wrote in 1996 that the other 
servicesspecifically the Strategic Rocket Forceswere risking national security to 
advance their positions: 
the problem of developing strategic nuclear forces is quite specific and 
should hardly be brought out for broad and open discussion.  It is not so 
terrible when the quantitative indicators of missiles and warheads on 
various platforms are cited.  It is much worse when they disclose the 
strong and weak points of our main weapons, their individual 
characteristics, areas and methods of patrolling, range of detection and 
tracking, and much else, which provides an invaluable service to foreign 
intelligence agents. 
                                                 
115 Alexei Arbatov, Nuclear Forces. 
116 See discussion in Chapter 2. 
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From my point of view, it is absolutely immoral, for the purpose of 
increasing the prestige of one component of the triad, to talk about 
accidents and emergency situations in the other components on the pages 
of open publications.  It is surprising that arguments on the verge of 
divulging classified data are presented as sprouts of democracy in the 
military sphere.117 
Not immune to political pressures, however, Yerofeev went on to list why he 
believed that SSBNs are superior to ICBMs for ensuring strategic deterrence: 
• SSBNs are continually moving and their location is unknown. 
• SSBNs are able to take up firing positions in the shortest possible time. 
• SSBNs can launch an attack from any region of the ocean. 
• SLBMs can hit up to two hundred targets in one salvo. 
• SSBNs can be deployed closer to their targets to minimize an opponents 
reaction time, and complicate an ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems 
response. 
• SSBNs can ensure the approach of missiles and warheads from one direction 
with a high density and guarantee a high probability of penetration of the 
enemys ABM systems. 
Yerofeev elaborated on this last point as follows: 
our countrys geostrategic position and the known locations of silo 
launchers and position areas of maneuvering missile systems predetermine 
the directions of approach of missiles and warheads to strike targets and 
enable the opposing side to build in advance a powerful, sufficiently 
effective and comparatively inexpensive antiballistic missile [ABM] 
defense oriented on repelling a strike namely from these directions.  It is 
problematic to penetrate such an ABM system due to problems with 
creating a high density of approaching warheads when using single-
warhead missiles of the Topol system from one direction.  In doing this, 
the enemys ABM system, due to the large distances and virtually 
instantaneous detection of missiles being launched, will have the 
maximum amount of time to prepare to repel such an strike.118 
                                                 
117 Oleg Yerofeev, The Maritime Component of the Nuclear Triad: It Embodies 
the Best Achievements of the Domestic Military-Industrial Complex, NVO, 14 March 
1996, reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 March 
1996, FTS 19960314000766. 
118 Ibid. 
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Yerofeevs scenarios are somewhat questionable.  It is highly unlikely that a 
large-scale nuclear exchange of the type he is describing would occur using only land-
based missiles.  Yerofeev implies that the SRF leadership wished to eliminate the sea-
based triad leg.  In fact, the most serious power plays by the SRF called for subordinating 
the sea-based and bomber legs of the triad under the command of the SRF.119  In the 
event that the United Statesor some other state deemed the opposing sidedeploys 
missile defenses the Russian nuclear arsenal would probably change.  According to 
Alexei Arbatov, if the United States does deploy missile defenses, Russia will probably 
deploy the next generation ICBMthe SS-27with MIRVs.120 
Russian SSBNs are not as quiet as their Western counterparts, and this makes 
them more easily detectable and therefore vulnerable.  There are also unresolved 
command and control issues relating to deployed SSBNs.121 
Despite these drawbacks, most Russian scholars and leaders accept the role of 
SSBNs in nuclear deterrence.  The questions seem to be how many and what type to 
build for the future. 
With respect to its own long-term institutional interests, the Russian Navy may be 
staking too much on nuclear deterrence.  Under the Soviet Union, and more recently, the 
SSBN force has been used to justify the entire navy: In order to ensure the preservation 
                                                 
119 Commander Calls for Strategic Deterrence Forces with Joint Command, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 December 1998, provided by BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts; accessed via Lexis-Nexis 08 March 2001. 
120 Alexei Arbatov, Nuclear Forces. 
121 Davydov, Cold War Arsenal. 
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and dependable functioning of the naval strategic nuclear forces under any 
conditionsthe Russian Navy must have general-purpose forces.122  In the past this has 
led to the construction of massive surface fleet, aviation assets, and shore infrastructure.  
This itself has sparked criticism.  In 1998, a Russian analyst wrote that 
the capability of [SSNs] independent ocean operation promised by [their] 
proponents soon proved to be a deception.  Initially the SSNs required 
creation of an ocean reconnaissance system, then support [for] deploying 
from bases and penetrating anti-submarine barriers and so on.  Finally, the 
impossibility of achieving the proper level of concealment of the USSRs 
SSNs and the prospect of the appearance of space means of detecting 
submarines in a submerged condition in the early 21st century essentially 
led to their depreciation as an absolute weapon, and the entire concept of 
developing a Navy built on the basis of the submarine fleet suffered a 
fiasco.123 
Relying on the SSBN to justify the existence of the Navy could be risky for 
additional reasons.  Some Russian leaders reportedly believe that command and control 
of SSBNs would be problematic during war.  In the event of nuclear conflict, Russian 
SSBNs would presumably receive their orders via radio.  The communications system 
was designed and built during the Soviet era, and it has several redundancies.  The 
SSBNs can get their messages via High Frequency or Very Low Frequency radio 
transmissions from ground stations or via satellite.  In addition, it has been reported that 
Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) radio waveswhich can penetrate water up to three 
                                                 
122 Valeriy Aleksin, and Eduard Shevelev, Fate of Russia and Her Navy 
Inseparable, 15 June 1996, NVO, reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, 4 April 1997, FTS 19970404001124. 
123 Yuriy Kuznetsov, On the Way to a Balanced Navy: Russia should Reject the 
Soviet Concept of Navy Organizational Development, NVO, 15 May 1998 reported and 
translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 22 June 1998, FTS 
19980622000558.  This statement discusses SSNs in particular but is applicable to 
SSBNs as well. 
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hundred meterscontinually broadcast an okay signal.  An ELF transmitterwhich 
can only transmit at a very low data ratecan order an SSBN to rise to communications 
depth to receive messages that are more detailed.  Each of these communications 
pathways has several transmitting stations.124 
There are three major issues with the SSBN command and control system: age, 
vulnerability, and reliability.  Satellites may fail, and are more likely to do so as they age.  
Ground transmitting stations are also vulnerable to a preemptive attack.  Some politicians 
and commentators have questioned the reliability of these systems.125  Military and 
civilian leaders may determine there is too much risk in the SSBN program.  They may 
decide the command and control system is not robust enough.  They may they feel there 
is too much risk inherent in sending a submarine to sea with nuclear weapons, with no 
guarantee the crew will not sell it to the highest bidder.  They may decide there is too 
much risk of an onboard failure causing an accidental launch.126  If the SSBN force 
justifies the entire navy, and the government decides to do away with sea-based 
deterrence forces, the navys very existence will be in jeopardy. 
 
                                                 
124 E.V. Miasnikov, The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussions 
and Arguments, trans. Brian Finn and Renee Friedman (Moscow: Center For Arms 
Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, 1995), [http] Available online: 
fas.org/spp/eprint/snf03223.htm, [accessed 8 May 2001], Appendix 3. 
125 A summary of these debates is in Miasnikov, section 9.0. 
126 Thomas Nilsen, Accidental Nuclear War: Increased Risk of Nuclear missile 
Launch From Russian Submarines, Bellona Foundation, 5 May 1998, [http] Available 
online: www.bellona.no/imaker?id=9510&sub=1, [accessed 8 May 2001]; Miasnikov, 
section 10.0. 
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1. SSBN Force Structure Possibilities 
Strategic importance does not guarantee survival, much less robustness.  The 
trend of navy operations, maintenance, and construction does not bode well for the future.  
Russian and Western analysts agree that without significant reform and resource 
allocation, the naval strategic nuclear forces will be in serious trouble in the future.   
In 1995, according to official documents released under the START I treaty, 
Russia had 1,497 START-accountable nuclear launch devices (ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
bombers).  43 SSBNs carried 664 of these missiles with 2,492 START-accountable 
warheads.127 
Scenarios based on different assumptions have produced a variety of results.  
With no action, most forecasts are gloomy.  In 1997, Alexei Arbatov predicted that if the 
state took no additional action, by 2003 Russia would have only 666 strategic nuclear 
launchers and 3,216 strategic nuclear warheads.  Continuing that trend through 2010, 
Russia would have only 118 launchers and 442 warheads.  This would include only four 
SSBNs.128 
According to the assumptions and calculations of Radiy Zubkov published in 
1998, by 2003 the Russian Navy will be down to 448 warheads and 7 operational SSBNs.  
These numbers will drop to 2 SSBNs and 128 warheads by 2010.129 
                                                 
127 Alexei Arbatov, Nuclear Forces. 
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Zubkovs article presents some thought-provoking options for SSBN force 
structures.  He presents four scenarios that offer insight into future possibilities for the 
naval strategic nuclear forces, and by extension the entire Russian Navy. 
All four scenarios start with the same initial conditions.  Zubkov states that in 
1998 the force structure included twenty-six SSBNs, carrying a total of 2,272 warheads, 
of various classes as follows: 
• 6 Typhoon-class with 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs each with 10 warheads (1200 
warheads), 
• 7 Delta IV-class with 16 SS-N-23 SLBMs each with 4 warheads (448 
warheads), and 
• 13 Delta III-class with 16 SS-N-18 SLBMs each with 3 warheads (624 
warheads).130 
 
Scenario A relies on the following assumptions:  
• The service life of strategic missile submarines is up to 20 years (unchanged 
from the original plans). 
• No new nuclear powered missile submarines are commissioned. 
• The service life of SS-N-20 missiles is 10 years (unchanged from the original 
plans). 
• The government takes no action to save the SSBN force. 
 
Under these conditions the SSBN force structure will decline as depicted in Figure 4.  
Using scenario "A," the SSBN force will cease to exist in 2012. 
                                                 
130 Ibid.  The total number of submarines of each type does not always add up to 
the total shown on the figure because the graphed total only reflects the number of 
SSBNs with operational missiles.  In general, the difference is due to variations in service 























Figure 4 SSBN Force Levels Under Scenario A.131 
 
Scenario B relies on the following assumptions: 
• The service life of missile submarines is extended to 25 years. 
• No new nuclear powered missile submarines are commissioned. 
• The service life of SS-N-20 missiles is extended to 15 years. 
 
This scenario requires no new construction, but extends the service life of existing vessels 
and missiles.  This would require additional maintenance and expense, but would be 
cheaper than constructing new SSBNs.  It would, however, only be a patch.  Under this 
                                                 
131 Data for all figures in this chapter from Zubkov, Future. 
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scenario, Russias SSBN force structure will decline as depicted in Figure 5, and will 






















Figure 5 SSBN Force Levels Under Scenario B. 
 
Scenario C assumes the following: 
• The service life of missile submarines is extended to 25 years. 
• Borey-class SSBNs come into the navy to maintain its delivery potential 
within the range of 1000 to 1250 warheads. 
• The service life of SS-N-20 missiles is extended to 15 years. 
 
This is the same as scenario B, except the construction of the follow-on class SSBN 
maintains warhead levels as described.  The advantage of this scenario is that it allows 
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Figure 6 SSBN Force Levels Under Scenario C. 
 
Scenario D is essentially a more modest version of scenario C.  The only 
change is that construction of Borey-class SSBNs maintains a delivery potential of 
approximately five hundred warheads (versus 1000 to 1250 under C).  The results are, 
therefore, similar to those of scenario C with slightly less cost and capability.  Figure 7 

























Figure 7 SSBN Force Levels Under Scenario D. 
 



























Figure 8 Warhead Levels on SSBNs Under All Scenarios. 
 
These scenarios do not show the whole picture, because there are additional 
factors at work.  These scenarios assume that todays platforms will continue to exist.  
The financial difficulties facing the Russian Navy show that this is not a safe assumption.  
The future of the six Typhoon-class SSBNs is in doubt, and some sources list some of 
them as already written off.132  Even if the navy extends the service life of existing 
                                                 
132 Igor Kudrik, Typhoons to Remain In Service, Bellona Foundation, 11 
January 2000, [http] Available online: www.bellona.no/imaker?id=14203&sub=1.  It 
appears that Russia intends to decommission at least three Typhoon-class SSBNs. 
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SSBNs to twenty-five years, they will need significant maintenance to remain 
operational.  Some of these vessels are relatively old.  The Delta III-class SSBNsbuilt 
between 1976 and 1981are improvements on the earlier Delta classes.  The Delta I-
class first put to sea in 1973.  Most of the changes in the Delta-class were missile system 
upgrades.133 
It is also worthy of note that, even if all of the proposed SSBNs are constructed or 
refitted to remain in service, they will not all be operational all the time.  Some will  
always be in port for a variety of reasons.  Crews need rest.134  Ships need repairs.  A 
general rule of thumb is that one out of every three vessels can be at sea at a time; the rest 
will be in port for one reason or another.  In times of war or heightened tensions, 
however,  more vessels could deploy. 
Some of the above scenariosand all of them that do not predict the end of the 
SSBN forcerequire new construction.  Aside from financial problems, there are 
technical difficulties.  Only one hull of the new Borey-class SSBN, the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, 
has been laid down.  Its estimated delivery date is around 2004 or 2005.  If the state 
pursues scenario C, there is no time for further development delays.  The Borey-class 
SSBN was supposed to have a new solid-fueled missile, the Bark,  which failed during 
flight tests.  New plans call for a navalized version of the SS-27.  However, the new 
                                                 
133 Zubkov, Future; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding 
Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 
132-4; Norman Friedman, The Typhoon Saga Ends, U.S. Naval Institute Prceedings, 
July 1999, 91. 
134 This can be partially overcome by split-crewing, or giving each vessel two 
crews, as is done in the U.S. Navy.  With todays monetary and personnel shortages in 
Russia, this is not a realistic option for Moscow. 
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missile will require a complete redesign of the Borey-class SSBN.  Reports since 1998 
have not been clear as to whether work on the Yuriy Dolgorukiy has continued.135 
The Russian SSBN force seems to have an assured place in the states military 
plans, but the rest of the submarine force and navy is still in question.  During much of 
1996 and 1997, there was a running debate in the pages of Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 
Obozreniye regarding the proper role and size of the navy.  The participants were experts, 
politicians, and naval and military officers.  Two schools of thought developed during the 
debate: those who advocated parity with United States and NATO naval forces, and those 
who did not. 
Those who argued for naval parity had several reasons: 
• Russia should maintain its naval tradition. 
• While Russias economy is smaller than the U.S. economy, in Soviet times 
that was always the case, and Moscow competed with the West. 
• Despite the end of the Cold War, war has not been eliminated from the globe. 
• A strong navy would allow Russia to participate in a multi-polar world as 
an equal. 
• With a large navy, Russia could participate in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping 
operations. 
                                                 
135 Zubkov, Future; Marshal Reformer Locked in Strategic Conflict, The 
Russia Journal, Volume 3 Number 4(4), 22-28 February 1999, [http] Available online: 
www.russiajournal.com/printer/weekly1208.html, [accessed 28 February 2001]; Viktor 
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Degtyar, State Missile Center Design Bureau Imeni Academician Makeyev Director-
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• While treaties limit conventional and nuclear forces, naval forces (except for 
SSBNs) are not thus limited.  Western nations will continue to develop their 
naval might. 
• Russia has an extensive coastline.136 
 
Those who were against an attempt at naval parity with the Western powers relied 
on one main argument: economics.  Russias economic might today is approximately 
twenty to twenty-five times lower than the United States together with its main allies, 
with whose naval groupings it is proposed to maintain parity.  They also attacked the 
argument that Russias extensive coastline proves its need for a navy: 
Indeed, Russia surpasses the United States by almost two times in length 
of coastline, but it should be borne in mind here that over half of Russia's 
maritime border and over two-thirds of its entire coastline (with islands) is 
accounted for by Arctic ices unsuitable for conducting wide-scale combat 
operations at sea and on land and representing a convenient defensive line 
permitting even small forces to prevent an incursion into internal waters 
by any foreign navy.137 
 
B. OTHER NAVAL MISSIONS 
Given Russias world position, and the security concerns expressed in the 
countrys 2000 National Security Concept, the navy could play a wider role.  A stronger 
navy would allow Russia to express its displeasure with military-political blocs whose 
actions appear aggressive in Russian eyes.  The presence of a token Russian naval force, 
                                                 
136 Aleksin and Shevelev, Fate. 
137 Vladimir Sokolov, Fate and the Russian Navy: Parity with U.S. and NATO 
Navies Again is Proposed for Us, NVO, 5 July 1997, reported and translated by the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 July 1997, FTS 19970714001674. 
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even a single submarine, during the Kosovo crisis would have given NATO decision 
makers a distinctly different operational environment in the Adriatic.138 
The Russian Navy could also perform the traditional naval mission of protecting 
the nations interests abroad.  In early 2000, there was talk in Russia of deploying 
warships to the Persian Gulf.  This resulted from American and other coalition forces 
seizing two Russian tankers during sanctions operations.139  Some commentators in 
Russia have acknowledged changes in circumstances and capabilities.  Comparing the 
Soviet Navys world reach with that of todays navy, one Russian reporter recognized 
what was lacking: Had the same been so today, our foreign policy department would 
have had much more of [an] argument in favor of a peaceful settlement to the conflict 
with Iraq.140  The potential extension of this principle to other crisessuch as 
Kosovois obvious.  Russia could find a variety of uses for a strong navy in the foreign 
policy realm.  The words of former British Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell still ring true: 
A man of war is the best ambassador.141 
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Some Russian leaders have recommended similar roles.  In July 2000, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin suggested one himself.  According to reports from the Hong 
Kong press, Putin had given the Russian Pacific fleet orders in case of a conflict between 
China and Taiwan.  The orders reportedly directed the Russian Pacific fleet to prevent 
U.S. naval intervention.142 
The preceding are examples of what a better-equipped and properly maintained 
Russian Navy could do.  All indications are that Russian leader would like to pursue 
these missions, but they require a navy with significant logistical support and basing 
capabilities.  The Russian Navy has not demonstrated that it is capable of such missions.  
During the most recent Northern Fleet deployment to the Mediterranean, the squadron 
limped home with limited fresh water because of mechanical problems with distilling 
plants.143 
The government has made some positive changes in the area of naval missions.  
Until recently, the navy was responsible for not only operations and training for national 
defense, but also for manning and recycling decommissioned nuclear submarines.  The 
Ministry of Atomic Energy recently assumed this role.144  Other mission trimming still 
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needs to occur.  In 1995, the Northern Fleet was responsible for thirty-two garrisons.  
Many of these had civic administrations run by the navy.  The Northern Fleet was 
responsible for public utilities.  In most cases, sailors did the work associated with these 
utilities.  The Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Yerofeev, reported that 
hundreds of sailors were manning boilers, water systems, and heating systems, and also 
maintaining roads and houses.145  Sailors were performing these tasks while ships and 
submarines were short of crewmembersas they still are.  In many cases, crews from 
other ships combine aboard one ship so they have enough people to go to sea.  This 
augmentation sometimes makes up thirty percent of a crew.146 
Russia has also demonstrated a capability to undertake non-traditional missions 
with its submarine force.  These missions will not justify its existence, but they may 
provide operational training and some additional funds.  On at least three occasions the 
Russian Navy has used an SSBN to conduct scientific research.  In 1995, a Delta III-class 
submarine launched an atmospheric monitoring probe for a German research institute.  
The submarine launched the probe using a specially modified SS-N-18 missile.  By all 
accounts, the procedure was identical to that which would be followed in a wartime 
missile launch for the submarine crew.  In 1998, a Russian Delta IV-class SSBN 
launched a German satellite into orbit from the Arctic.  In these operations, the German 
research institute provided funds to Russia to cover both the redesign of the missile, and 
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its launch from the submarine.147  This may be a way to bring some Western funds into 
Russia, while maintaining proficiency for the submarine force. 
 
C. NEW POLICIES 
In addition to the new National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, Russia in 
early 2000 released a new maritime policy, The Principles of RF [Russian Federation] 
Policy in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period Through the Year 2010.148  Among 
other things, this document defines the priorities for development of the navy.  According 
to the policy, the number one priority is strengthening state support, regulation, and 
control of Russian Federation naval activities, including the adoption of a complex of 
targeted measures which will stimulate these activities149  This appears to be an 
acknowledgement by the government that the biggest problems affecting in the navy 
today rest not solely with the navy.  The navys problems are inherent in the government 
and state as a whole. 
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The second priority, the first within the navy itself, is support and qualitative 
modernization of forces and equipment of the naval component of the strategic nuclear 
forces, keeping them at the required quantitative level.150  This indicates that nuclear 
deterrence is, and will remain, an important mission for the navy. 
To achieve the desired modernization of naval nuclear deterrence capabilities, 
SSBNs have the primary role: ensuring the balanced development of the naval 
component of the strategic nuclear forces[means that the state] should foresee creating 
new generation strategic missile submarines, modernizing and repairing existing ships of 
this class, [and] developing and producing missile arms for them.151 
The World Ocean, a national policy statement approved in January 1997, 
confirms that Russia still views its navy as important.  While not exclusively or even 
primarily a military program, The World Ocean includes naval components; and it 
offers an informative description of why Russia views the oceans as important: 
• A considerable portion of the strategic nuclear power of other states is located 
within the ocean.  Foreign navies, capable of striking Russian territory with 
nuclear and conventional weapons and influencing the stability of the world, 
are becoming more powerful. 
• The world economy depends on sea communications. 
• Seventy-five percent of the worlds industry and people live within 500 
kilometers of the sea. 
• The ocean is a source of significant mineral, biological, and other 
resources.152 
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Moreover, The World Ocean lays out a plan for developing the navy for the 
future.  This is the most specific government plan available for public review.  It provides 
a flexible framework for a three-phased development of the Russian Navy. 
The initial phase was to run from 1997 through 2002.  During this phase, the main 
goal was to stop the uncontrolled decline of the navy.  The Medium-Term Phase
planned for 2003 through 2007addresses the financial, legal, political, environmental 
protection, scientific technical, and other sea-related activities of Russia with the aim of 
meeting current needs and ensuring long-term interests and needs.153  The final phase 
(its duration unspecified) calls for the development of a new structure of Russias 
activity in the World Ocean.  During this third phase, the results of the earlier stages will 
be available, and Russia will be able to acquire an important role in the World Ocean.154 
The World Ocean document has been in place for four years, and phase one 
should be well underway.  Moscow has, however, made little progress on stemming the 
decline of the navy.  This does not bode well for the success of the plan outlined in The 
World Ocean.  The window for its success is also closing.  According to the document 
itself, the most effective projects of the Program have to be implemented, as a rule, 
within three to five years.155 
Valeriy Aleksin, former Chief Navigator of the Russian Navy, echoed the 
provisions of The World Ocean in his 1998 article, The Submarine Fleet and Russias 
                                                 




National Security.  Aleksin supported the development of a State Program of Revival 
of the Navy.  He called for a three-phase program to restore the navy.  His plan is 
consistent with the ideas expressed in The World Ocean. 
Aleksin called for a two-stage building program following a conservation phase: 
• Phase one: Determine what, when, and how [it is] necessary to preserve in the 
next 5 years [portions] of the existing navy to form a combat nucleus of 
Russias future fleet. 
• Phase two: Construction of new shipsfor reliable completion of the navys 
missions at the necessary and sufficient level in the next 10-15 years. 
• Phase three: Construction of new ships to replace obsolete ones, ensure 
guaranteed accomplishment of the missions of protecting Russias vital 
interests at sea, and also participate as part of peacekeeping forces under the 
flag of the UN in the interests of the world community in key areas of the 
world for the next 20-25 years.156 
 
Because this proposed program is similar to that in The World Ocean, it too suffers 
from the fact that the Russian Navys decline has not stopped.  Both plans, Aleksins and 
that in The World Ocean, have the advantage of being flexible.  They nonetheless 
require concrete action on the part of the government; and this has not yet happened.  
Until it does, the Russian Navy will continue to decline. 
 
D. NEW LEADERSHIP 
On 28 March 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Sergey Ivanov 
Russias new Defense Minister.  One of several appointments Putin made that day, this 
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greatly changes the prospects of military reform and the future of each of the military 
services. 
The most prominent change because of this appointment is the complete 
elimination of the conflict between Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and the Chief of the 
General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin.  Some reports claim that the existing leadership of the 
general staff will be the next to go, but that is not clear.157  Regardless of Kvashnin's fate, 
certain things will change. 
Reform is now more likely to occur in the armed forces than at any time since 
1991.  Sergey Ivanov is widely regarded as Putins most loyal and trusted subordinate.  
Ministry of Defense personnel and military officers will perceive that Ivanovs policies 
and directives have the full support of the President.  In addition, Ivanov headed the 
Security Council when it drafted the reform bill, the Plan for the Organizational 
Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.  He is intimately familiar with 
its requirements, and is considered well-suited to fulfill them.158 
Since reform now seems likely to occur, a large question remains: what does 
reform entail?  The precise contents of the reform package are a secretpresumably to 
save it from outside lobbying and political infighting.  There is also a lot of money 
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involved in the military-industrial complex.159  Certain aspects of the projected reform 
plan have been made public: 
• Reform will cut 365,000 servicemen and 100,00 to 120,000 civilians from the 
armed forces. 
• The Military-Space Defense Troops and Military-Space Forces will separate 
from the SRF.160  They will form their own new service, the Space Forces. 
• The SRF will become part of the Air Force by 2006. 
• There will be a transition from conscription to a volunteer force.161 
On the same day as the Ivanov appointment, Putin appointed Lyubov Kudelina as 
Deputy Minister of Defense.  While Kudelina is the first woman appointed to such a high 
position within the Ministry of Defense, the appointment is noteworthy for other reasons.  
Before this appointment, Kudelina worked in the Ministry of Finances.  There she was a 
harsh critic of the military.  She continually scrutinized military spending procedures and 
attempted to keep military expenditures within authorized limits.162  This appointment in 
particular makes it likely that military finances will be more strictly monitored and 
controlled by the government. 
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The final question to consider here is what these changes may mean for the 
submarine force.  This is not entirely clear.  All the public statements by Ivanov and the  
relevant reports in the press have referred to the navy only in passing, if at all.  It appears 
that the navys nuclear deterrence mission is safe.  In describing the blueprint of reform 
Ivanov stated: It is planned to develop a Russian Strategic Missile Troops land attack 
group independently while preserving the existing structure of strategic nuclear forces: 
the ground, aviation and sea components.163 
Sergey Ivanov and the other recent Ministry of Defense appointees are also critics 
of NATO.  They were among the government leaders in opposing NATO expansion.  
They will likely retain attitudes critical of U.S. and NATO policy.164  The navy may 
therefore benefit from the new appointments, if the new managers of the Ministry of 
Defense support funding for the navy. 
There are reasons for the navy to lower its expectations, however.  One of the 
major results of the new appointments is the defeat of Sergeev and his reform plans.  
These plans placed greater reliance on nuclear forces, at the expense of conventional 
troops.  If the Kvashnin faction wins its campaign for conventional force modernization, 
the future could be less bright for the navy.  Ethnic separatism, frontier instability, and 
Islamic fundamentalism may be perceived as the dominant threats.  These are 
predominantly domestic and continental concerns.  The militarys performance in 
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Chechnya has fueled concern over the quality of the ground forces.  Many military and 
civilian leaders believe that this is evidence of their neglect under the previous Defense 
Minister.  Increased concentration on ground force improvements will likely cause the 
navy further neglect. 
The most recent reports from Russia suggest that these trends continue.  The 
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Kormiltsev, was 
promoted to Deputy Defense Minister on 27 April 2001.  This was coupled with the 
ouster of the long-serving Commander-in-Chief of the SRF, General Vladimir Yakovlev.  
These changes portend a growing role for the Ground Forces, and a more limited one for 
the SRF.  It appears that concern over domestic and continental threatsfrontier 
instability,  ethnic separatism and Islamic fundamentalismcontinues to grow.165 
Taken in the context of current Russian security concerns, the new appointments 
will probably mean a continuation of a long-standing pattern for the navy.  It will 
continue to play a significant role in nuclear deterrence.  Its other capabilities will also 
continue to suffer from the neglect of the countrys political and military leaders. 
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The factors that will influence the size and shape of the Russian submarine force are 
manifold, and the relationships among them are complex, with some currently in flux.  
The national security leadership shuffle by President Vladimir Putin continues, and the 
results of military reform are still unknown.  Whatever the result, the fate of the entire 
submarine forceindeed, to some extent, the entire Russian Navyresides mainly with 
the SSBN force. 
 
A. THE IMPORTANT FACTORS 
Several factors favor the retention and improvement of the naval strategic nuclear 
forces: 
• SSBNs still account for a significant portion of the Russian strategic nuclear 
arsenal, even though they often conduct their patrols in port in current 
circumstances. 
• The START II Treaty eliminates land-based MIRVed ICBMs.166 
• Depending on their launch points, SLBMs may have shorter flight times to 
North American targets than ICBMs or bombers. 
• Russia perceives the United States and NATO as potentially aggressive 
adversaries. 
Russian SSBNs currently play an important role in the Russian strategic nuclear 
deterrence posture.  The ships, missiles, and warheads exist, as do the operating 
procedures.  Russia has maintained a maritime nuclear deterrent force since the early 
1960s, and there are no indications Moscow intends to change this. 
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Still, there are some definite negative indicators. 
• Russias SSBN force is aging and is not receiving the required maintenance. 
• Russias current economic situation does not support modernization. 
• The Soviet/Russian Navy has historically held a low position in the hierarchy 
of military services. 
• Politically, the ground forces appear to be rising in status at the expense of the 
strategic nuclear forces. 
• The protracted conflict in Chechnya and instability on Russias southern 
border also suggest that the leaderships priorities will favor the ground 
forces. 
• Among the strategic nuclear forces, ICBMs (fixed and land-mobile) appear to 
be favored because of perceived cost and command-and-control advantages. 
Two factors will probably dominate all others in determining the future of the 
submarine force.  The most important of these is what President Vladimir Putin and his 
closest advisers plan for the navys future.  The second most important is the direction of 
the Russian economy in the next few years. 
The content and results of military reform are unknown.  How President Putin and 
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov view the military and assess national security 
requirements will be a deciding factor.  In the past, Putin has supported the navy.  Early 
in his tenure as President, he portrayed himself as a true friend of the navy.167  This has 
changed since the August 2000 Kursk disaster.  Since then, he has not made high profile 
visits to ships, nor has he publicly supported the navy as he did before the accident.  
Putins views and policies are important because without his support the submarine 
forces future may be in doubt, even with strong economic growth.  He could direct that 
additional funds be budgeted to other servicesfor example, the ground forces and/or the 
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air forcesif he determined that they are more useful for meeting the nations security 
requirements. 
Russias economic condition is the second most important factor.  Given the 
countrys other priorities, including other military priorities, without improvements in 
economic performance, it may prove difficult to maintain, much less modernize, the 
Russian submarine force.  The required maintenance and the replacement systems
particularly missiles and Borey-class SSBNswill require significant investments.  
Without an economic upswing Russia could modernize its military forces to some extent, 
but the costs to the countrys economic health would be immense.  Without Putins 
approval, however, even an economic windfall would only marginally improve the 
submarine forces condition. 
 
B. THE WORST CASE 
If Russian leaders choose to neglect the submarine force, it will slowly become 
less capable and less safe. 
The SSBNshistorically the core of the submarine forceare in a precarious 
position.  The submarines and missiles are aging.  There is only one replacement 
submarine under constructionthe Yuriy Dolgoruky.  The Russian government canceled 
the original missile designed for this vessel.  Without new submarines, the future of the 
maritime strategic nuclear deterrence force is limited.  The missiles on Typhoon-class 
SSBNs are at or near the end of their service lives.  Russia needs a new submarine class 
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and new missiles to maintain the SSBN force at a reasonable size and in reliable 
conditions. 
The general-purpose submarine forces will degrade under this scenario as well.  
One of their principal missions is to defend the SSBN force.  Russian leaders may 
sacrifice the general-purpose submarine forces to save the SSBNs.  If the general-purpose 
submarine forcesdesigned mainly to counter U.S. and NATO naval powerwither 
more than they already have, Russia will continue to be unable to respond to certain crisis 
situations. 
If Russian leaders continue to neglect the submarine force, the probability of 
another Kursk-type accident will rise.  A catastrophic environmental disaster is possible, 
particularly with nuclear-powered submarines lacking proper maintenance.  If living and 
pay conditions in the navy worsen, the situation may deteriorate even further.  Incidents 
of theft and vandalism may increase.  The theft of a nuclear warhead or an entire 
submarine is possible.  Some commentators fear that if the crewmembers on an SSBN are 
not paid, the crew might sell either their services or the vessel itself to a foreign country.  
There have already been attempts to steal nuclear materials from disposal sites.168 
 
C. THE BEST CASE 
Under more positiveand highly unlikelyconditions, the submarine force 
could remain the center of the Russian navy, and increase in importance to the state.  The 
SSBN force could grow.  Borey-class submarines could enter the fleet to maintain and 
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increase current force levels.  New missiles could replace the SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 
SLBMs on Typhoon and Delta IV-class SSBNs.  New vessels could replace the aging 
general-purpose submarines.  The government could budget and deliver the money to 
repair and maintain the existing general-purpose vessels.  Funding for operations could 
increase, and could be provided regularly, allowing crews to maintain proficiency. 
While this scenario would avoid the problems described in the worst case,  it is 
extremely unlikely.  Few signals have indicated a move to prominence for the navy.  This 
scenario would require huge investments at the expense of other services.  The prevailing 
trends in Moscow make it implausible. 
 
D. THE LIKELY FUTURE 
Neither the worst case nor the best case is likely.  There have been no 
indications that the Russian government has made any major decisions about the Russian 
submarine force.  Admirals and politicians regularly make public statements declaring 
their support for submarines.  Leaders recognize the submarines importance for national 
security, yet they have taken no decisive action.  In order for the submarine force to 
thrive, the government must make it a priority. 
The biggest problems facing the submarine forceand the navyare solvable 
only at the highest levels of the Russian government.  Because that government is 
dominated by the executive (the powers of the Russian Duma are much smaller than 
those of the U.S. Congress), the personal choices of President Vladimir Putin and 
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov are critical. 
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If the highest levels of leadership decide to develop the submarine force, the 
necessary resources will be provided.  The contents of the still-secret military reform plan 
may  therefore largely determine the future of the submarine force.  Putin has declared 
that the strategic nuclear deterrence forces will remain a triad, but the relative proportions 
are still unclear.169 
The government can only correct the funding shortfalls by increasing both the 
amount of money allocated to the navy, and the amount actually received.  Military and 
political leaders could take steps to eliminate wanton fraud and corruption.  Military 
reform could include scaling back what the navy must do.  Too much is expected of it 
and not enough resources are provided.  Because the navy is unlikely to receive much 
more money, a logical solution could be mission elimination or redefinition.  The 1998 
elimination of the navys obligation to supervise and pay for the dismantlement of 
decommissioned nuclear submarines is a promising beginning.170  The government could 
continue by trimming the navys shore infrastructure responsibilities, such as providing 
public utilities to towns.  The government could transfer operations in the Caspian Sea to 
the border guards and control over the nuclear test sites at Novaya Zemlya to the Ministry 
of Atomic Energy.  The navy is unlikely to initiate such changes because the admirals are 
unwilling to give up part of their domain.  If the navys missions are to be trimmed, the 
government must take the initiative. 
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Factors outside Russias control will also affect any decision on the submarine 
force.  An international conflictsuch as a crisis over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, 
or renewed tensions involving Russian ships in the Persian Gulfmight draw attention to 
Russias naval plight.  This might add to the call for further naval development.  If, 
however, the Chechen campaign continues to underscore Russias need for ground 
forces, the submarine force may continue to suffer.  A U.S. decision to build missile 
defenses could also affect Russias submarine force.  Such a U.S. decision could lead 
Russia to push for changes to the START treaties.  For example, Moscow would 
probably seek a revision in the START II treaty to  allow MIRVed ICBMs.  This would 
remove one of the submarine force's advantages (MIRVed intercontinental-range 
missiles), but it would refocus national leaders' attention on nuclear weapons, and could 
thereby enhance the status of the submarine force. 
The most likely scenario falls somewhere between the best and worst 
outlined above.  It appears probable that the SSBN-centered submarine force will retain a 
low operations tempo.  The general purpose submarines will probably only go to sea in 
preparation for distant missionssuch as the planned (then canceled) 2000 deployment 
to the Mediterranean, or the recent deployment to India and South East Asia.  The Kursk 
was training for a deployment to the Mediterranean when it sank in August 2000.171 
Furthermore, given the funding constraints, SSBN patrols will probably decrease.  
That is, SSBNs will normally conduct their alert periods at the pier.  This will save the 
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money the government would otherwise need to pay for fuel to get the vessel to sea.  It 
will also lessen stress on the submarine hulls and other equipment, reducing the required 
repairs.  It is likely that during times of crisis some of these SSBNs would go to sea.  
Their communications connectivity and operational capacity would be questionable, 
however.  Having had little experience at sea, they would be more likely to have 
accidents and would be less able to evade an adversarys anti-submarine capabilities. 
According to the most likely scenario identified by the analysis in this thesis, a 
small number of new submarines will enter the Russian Navy over time, but not at nearly 
the same rate at which existing vessels will be retired.  The submarines in Russias 
current inventory will rapidly lose their combat capability.  Because the government 
lacks  the money to send them to sea and maintain them in proper condition, the scenario 
suggests, they may be dangerous to their own crews and to the environment, as well as 
ineffective in combat. 
To avoid this future the Russian governmentspecifically President Vladimir 
Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanovwould have to make a conscious decision to 
make the effectiveness of submarinesboth SSBNs and general-purpose vesselsa 
priority.  They would have to devote enough of the budget to submarines to ensure their 
maintenance, operation, and future development.  Without such definitive policy 
decisions the Russian submarine force will slowly wither into a hollow force of limited 
numbers and capability. 
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